2004-01-19 - 1:27 a.m.

Third, ��well-being�� cannot explain all other moral notions in itself. Scanlon even thinks that an important strength of contractualism is that ��it can account for the significance of different moral notions, within a unified moral framework, without reducing all of them to a single idea.�� (216) In many cases, gains and losses in well-being are obviously a relevant factor in deciding rejectability of principles, but sometimes we have to take into considerations of other factors. For example in a case of aid, we also have to consider whether the sufferer��s claim to aid would be undermined by the fact that his suffer was caused by his own fault. In this case, the consideration of responsibility cannot be understood in terms of well-being. In many cases, there may be strong generic reasons in rejecting principles, which appeal to other considerations other than well-being of the individuals involved.

On the whole, Scanlon thinks that although there are substantive judgments and moral claims involved in reasonable rejection of principles, they are guided by the general aim and point of the ideal of justifiability to others. The requirement of justifiability to others does identify some considerations as relevant and rule out some others. These considerations are held constant in assessing principles. This does not mean they are beyond question, but just that they are not being questioned at the moment. (214)

Scanlon��s defense has some force. In deciding which considerations can be counted as generic reasons and which of the generic reasons are most salient in a certain situation, we are not judging aimlessly with an ad hoc appeal to intuitions but should be motivated by the general contractualist commitments concerning ��what we owe to each other��. There is no fixed list of ��morally relevant considerations�� or ��morally excluded reasons��, independent of the contractualist aim of justifiability to others. This aim ��moves us to work out a system of justification that meets its demands, and this leads to a continuing process of revising and refining our conception of the reasons that are relevant and those that are morally excluded in certain contexts.�� (157) After all, ��what we owe to each other�� is just a portion of the wider concept of ��morality��, and it is not illegitimate to draw conclusions from other domains to justify the account itself. However, I think this defense may still be insufficient in other aspects. For example, it still does not tell clearly how to compare the relative strength of generic reasons. Here, I agree with Pogge that Scanlon has involved even more additional general moral commitments when he addresses specific moral issues as integral part of his contractualism. The result is, ��what we owe to each other�� provides answers uniquely coincident with the moral views prevalent in our time and culture. Contractualism is free of counter-intuitive examples, however, it is not because of the account itself, but by the general moral commitments it involves. Therefore, the contractualist account ��can easily be used to reach the opposite of moral conclusions Scanlon endorsed by adding different general moral commitments instead�Xfor instance, the consequentialist commitment��

For Scanlon who claims that reasons correspond to ��judgment sensitive attitude��, it may not be a problem in his theory to call for judgments when certain generic reasons are in conflict. However, as a normative theory, it may not provide us with enough guidance in deciding which of these generic reasons are more important. Substantive moral judgment sill plays an important role in moral thinking. It may be perfectly well if Scanlon��s theory just aims at characterizing our ordinary moral thinking and explaining our moral intuitions; yet it can tell us very little in how to resolve moral conflicts and it does not provide any clear guidance for our behavior. On one hand, if contractualism can only provide answers perfectly coincident with those of our moral intuitions, there can be no moral improvement under contractualism. On the other, if different moral commitments are employed in the contractualist framework, it is very possible to provide answers that are relative in certain sense. After all, the judgments of the weight of different reasons are different among people, a feminist may put more emphasis on fairness and equality but a welfarist may put more on well-being and utility. If a good normative theory is to provide theoretically plausible answers for us to resolve moral conflicts, then Scanlon may have to admit that his account is insufficient. The inability to provide a feasible weight to different reasons limits the applicability and usefulness of his account.

One way to avoid these difficulties is moving back to the Complaint Model. However, it is too costly for Scanlon to do so. Apart from the theoretical difficulties mentioned in his discussion about moral holism, this move would also make his account comes even closer to consequentialism. ��What we owe to each other�� may turns out to be just a special form of consequentialism, employing distributive justifiability rather than aggregative justifiability. Another solution is to suggest a clearer method in assessing the strength of relative reasons. It is difficult to suggest a universal standard, but if it is possible, it may further increase the attractiveness of contractualism as a normative theory.

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