2003-05-06 - 2:34 a.m.

This an an essay about abortion. I think it is the best piece of work in my undergraduate study, particularly in applied ethics. Personally I do think abortion is morally acceptable but may not be morally good. My consideration is whether giving birth to the fetus is really good to the fetus itself (may be himself or herself is more suitable). In this essay, however, I will try to deny Judith Thomson's argument which can yield my position.

"Abortion, Rights and Moral Standards"

Simon Kwong June, 2001

Judith Thomson in her landmarking article ��A Defense of Abortion�� (1971) presents a nice argument that abortion is morally permissible. Traditionally the controversies over this topic lie on whether fetuses are human beings or persons but Thomson does not argue by this strategy. It is because the concept of a human being or a person is itself very vague that it is difficult to determine a sharp limit that can avoid slippery slope arguments. Moreover, the question ��is it a human?�� is not decisive for the question because being a human or a person is neither necessary nor sufficient for the rightness and wrongness of killing a fetus. Therefore, Thomson simply assumes that fetuses are human beings and possess the right to life, She continues to argue that even if it was the case, abortion is still morally permissible. I will try to present her argument as simple as possible and point out what I think the crucial mistakes in her argument.

Before going deep into my argument, let��s first make clear what Thomson actually claims. The focus of Thomson in her article is not whether abortion is morally good or bad but rather whether it is morally permissible. In other words, what she concerns is not whether we should or should not engage in abortion but whether we are morally allowed to do so. In fact, she tends to think that abortion is morally bad and we should not engage in it in many cases. However, no matter how bad abortion is, it is not unjust for us to engage in it. Therefore, various accusations that abortion is ��immoral��, like the one ��abortion is deliberate murder��, or ��abortion disrespects the sanctity of human lives��, are all irrelevant to her main argument. Even if abortion should not be practiced in many cases, Thomson thinks that it is morally allowed because there is no moral responsibility that we should not engage in doing so.

We should not do something does not imply that we are not allowed to do it. We should not, for example, occupy the only available seat in a public bus and make a pregnant woman stands for the journey, although we are allowed to do so. We are allowed to do so because the ticket I bought entails my right to get any available seat on the bus. To give seat to the pregnant woman is something beyond my duty and I am not morally required or responsible to do so. My refusal to give seat would not be unjust although it is a virtue to give seat to the woman. Thomson argues that refrain from abortion is also beyond our duty and we have no responsibility to do so. Pregnant mothers have the right to abortion �V a right that cannot be deprived by arbitrary reason. The right of mother to abortion does not mean pregnant mothers should engage in abortion. It just means that whatever decided and chosen by the mother is legitimate. Even if in some case the mother should not abort her fetus, we should respect her choice. Again, it shows that even abortion is sometimes evil, it does not pose an attack to woman��s right in abortion. These evils may be considerations for the pregnant mother in deciding whether to exercise her right in abortion, nevertheless, it does not mean woman should not be given that right.

Such claim is a strong defense for abortion �V at least mothers are justified to have abortion. How does Thomson establish such claim? She starts with two commonyly agreed premises. We all agree that (i) women should have the right over the use of her body; and (ii) fetuses, as agreed by her opponents, should have the right to life. She argues that even fetuses possess the right to life, it does not possess the right to use the mothers�� body for their continuation of lives, and therefore there is no corresponding responsibility for the mothers to suffer for nine months and provide the necessary conditions for the continuation of lives of the fetuses. With the right to the use of one��s own body, mothers are said to possess the right to abortion.

Two things can be noted for her argument for discussion. First, she does not argue that women should practice abortion but just argues that they should have the right to do so. Abortion should be permitted and women should be given the free choice to do so. The idea of permissibility is closely linked with responsibility in her account. Abortion is morally permissible because we have no moral responsibility not to do so. A moral responsibility is generated if there is a corresponding right for others. There may be various justifications for the rise of a right. It is not necessary to discuss all of them here given the two rights being discussed �V the rights of life for fetuses and the right to the use of own body for mothers �V are assumed. I will examine how Thomson tries to derive the right to abortion from these two rights. The second thing to be noted is that Thomson does not argue directly from the right to the use of one��s own body to the right to abortion. We have the right to our own body does not directly entail that we have the right to kill another person. It involves a conflict between the right to use one��s own body and the right to life of the fetuses. What Thomson needs to argue is that the right to life of the fetuses does not impose any responsibility to the mothers not to abort.

One possible misunderstanding here is to assume that Thomson thinks that the right to life of the fetuses is out-weighed by the right of the use of own body of the mothers. If it is the case, that the right to life of the fetuses are out-weighed so that abortion is permissible, then it seems she has not provided enough justification for the claim. However, Thomson does not argue in this way actually, claiming that the right to the use of one��s own body is relatively more important than the right to life. This is a matter involving a calculation for the relative importance of the two rights. Thomson simply does not make such calculation. She claims that the right to life simply does not impose any responsibility or obligation for the mothers not to abort. She does not claim that there is such responsibility and such a responsibility is out-weighed by other considerations but there is simply no such responsibility. Let��s see what she means by the right to life.

Certainly, the right to life does not entail the right to be given at least the bare minimum one needs for continued life, or else it will be our responsibility to save every possible life. Therefore the right to life of the fetuses does not necessarily entail the right to the use of their mothers�� womb. In this sense, the mother has no responsibility in providing the womb for the fetuses. Let��s called this conclusion (1). Afterwards, she claims that abortion does not violate the fetus��s right to life. It is because the right to life does not entails the right not to be killed but only the right not to be killed unjustly. The right to life does not entail the right not be killed by anybody in every situation �V if it is the case, then we cannot kill another for self-defense. Abortion would be said to have violated the right to life of the fetus even if the continue existence of the fetus will endanger the life of the mother. Thomson thinks that the right to life only entails the right not to be killed by unjust reasons. The killing of a fetus is not unjust because following from (1), the mother have no responsibility to provide her body for the fetus, thereby leading to the death of the fetus. Let��s call this conclusion (2). Thomson gives other arguments for the responsibility of the mother but for the sake of the present discussion, I will leave it to the later parts of the essay.

So far Thomson has proved from (1) to (2) that the right to life of fetuses does not entail the right to use their mothers�� wombs, and also rejecting to provide wombs for fetuses and thereby killing the fetuses is not unjust and has not violated the rights to life of fetuses. She then proceeds to argue that women should have the right to abortion. She thinks that the necessary condition for a right to abortion is fulfilled if abortion does not violate the right to life of the fetuses. The sufficient condition, on the other hand, is fulfilled if mothers do not have the responsibility to provide their body for fetuses. Let��s consider the two conditions separately.

I will first examine the sufficient condition. As argued above, the right to life of fetuses does not entail any responsibility for mothers to provide any help for them. Does (i) the absence of responsibility in providing their bodies for fetuses even it is necessary for their continue existence entails (ii) the absence of responsibility for mothers not engaging in abortion? Thomson thinks yes and I think it is not the case. The fact that mothers have no responsibility to provide their bodies to fetuses does not mean they have no responsibility to refrain from killing them. Abortion is not only a matter in abstaining help to fetuses but also a kind of killing the fetuses. The distinction between not offering help to save the life of a fetus is obscured in the case of abortion because to abstain from help is to kill. Their distinction can be made clear in an imagined case where the two are separated. Using Thomson��s own example: if you are not the sole person that can provide the kidney for the continue survival of the violinist (may be your neighbour Mr. James also have the specific kidney that is needed by him), then your unplug from him will not cause his death (suppose he can still survive when he is transplanted from you to Mr. James). In this case, you do not have any responsibility to provide him with your kidney, but you still have a responsibility not to kill him for unjust reasons. You can reasonably say to him, ��I have no responsibility to help you sustaining life and I unplug myself from you without violating your right to life. Although Mr. James may deny him for the very same reason, it does not mean the rejection of anyone of us will kill him. If everyone available reject to help him and therefore leads to his death, then an individual rejection may be said to contribute to his death for a certain extent, but it does not mean any of us has killed him by our individual rejection. While you can reasonably unplug him from you, you still have to observe the responsibility not to kill him for unjust reasons, given his right to life. You cannot kill him, say, just because you do not want to help him.

In other cases, refraining from help may not be equal to killing. Yet, in the case of abortion, refraining from help is empirically equivalent to killing, and even an unjust killing. Mothers have no responsibility to provide their bodies to fetuses, but they do have the responsibility not to kill them for unjust reasons. Abortion is the killing of fetuses, and to do so is to violate the responsibility not to kill a human being. In more simple words, mothers are said to have no responsibility in saving their fetuses by providing them with their wombs, but they have the responsibility in not killing fetuses. Therefore, mothers do have a responsibility not to kill fetuses. They do not have a responsibility to provide help to save the fetuses is not sufficient for the claim that they do not have a responsibility not to kill the fetuses.

There may be two possible responses for Thomson. The first one argues that not to save and to kill are the very same action in abortion. Therefore if I have no responsibility in doing one then I have no responsibility in doing another. If I have no responsibility to save a fetus then I also have no responsibility in not killing the fetus. However, it is a bad argument. We should note that here the conflict is not between two responsibilities. It is not a case where my responsibility not to kill is in conflict with a responsibility not to save. We have no responsibility not to save but just do not have the responsibility to save. If I have the responsibility not to kill, then no matter whether we have a responsibility to save or not, we have to fulfill our responsibility not to kill. We cannot say that because the mothers have no responsibility to save their fetuses, then they also do not have the responsibility not to kill the innocent fetuses. Although it is the very same action, there are two responsibilities involved.

Another response is to deny that abortion violates our responsibility not to kill for unjust reasons. Thomson seems too be aware of the above opposition. She argues that abortion does not kill fetuses on unjust ground. It is supposed by her argument that mothers have no responsibility to provide their bodies for fetuses. The killing of fetuses in abortion when mother remove herself from the fetus is unjust, as argued by Thomson, because mothers are exercising their right of using one��s own body in doing so. However, there may be some refinements for such a right. If the right to life is the right not to be killed on unjust grounds, then the right to use one��s own body should also be a right to use one��s own body not on unjust grounds. If it is the case, then an opponent of Thomson can also argues that to remove the fetus from one��s own body is unjust because it kills an innocent life. Therefore we are not violating the right of the mother to use her own body when we prohibit her from abortion. We have no responsibility to respect her choice because her choice is based on unjust reason if she chooses not to help. Here, we can see that argument for the two sides are at a tie and cannot resolve the matter. Thomson argues that it is not unjust to kill fetuses because we have the right not to save them by removal of help. On the other hand, opponents can argue that it is not unjust to stop the mothers exercising their right to use their own body because doing so will kill the fetus. Here, we need something more than the two assumed right to life and the right to use of own body to decide what is just and unjust.

This leads us to the debate to the concept of responsibility. Does mother have some special responsibilities over fetuses except the responsibility not to a human being unjustly? Thomson argues that mothers do not have any responsibility unless they are assumed to have it either implicitly or explicitly. The mere biological relationship between mothers and fetuses does not generate specific moral responsibility. One counter-argument available to Thomson��s opponents is to claim that mothers are casually responsible for the creation of fetuses. The fetuses come into existence because of the voluntary action of their parents. No one forces the mothers to get pregnant and the fetuses are created out of deliberate actions of the parents given that they should be fully acknowledged of the consequences of having sexual intercourse. The fetuses are their own fetuses, but not the fetuses of their of their neighbours, their relatives or any other people. It is their parents that bring them to this world and parents should not just neglect their offspring and let fetuses die ��naturally�� after birth. Parents should be morally responsible for the existence of fetuses.

Thomson disagrees that these factors should be counted because a woman can also said to be responsible if she become pregnant because of carelessness, ignorance or even failure in contraception. For example, we may also claim that a woman who is being raped and get pregnant is responsible for her fetus because she does not take vigilance when she go out at night. Mothers may have different responsibilities in different cases and the vagueness of the idea seems to create great difficulties for legal intervention.

Thomson is right that mother can even be said to be responsible if she become pregnant because of not having a hysterectomy to avoid a rape. Women can always be accused of responsible for they have not done the very best to prevent the pregnancy. However, it is also a slippery slope argument. Although we do not have a very clear boundary for responsibility of mothers in bringing the conception of fetuses, it does not mean in some obvious case that mothers do not have such responsibility. In the case of deliberate sexual intercourse between two mature adults who perfectly know the possibility of pregnancy and still do not adopt any contraceptive method, I tend to consider that they have already assumed the responsibility to pregnancy implicitly if it turns out that the woman really become pregnant. It is unjust to remove the fetus after conception when we are responsible for the creation of such fetus.

Someone would argue that pregnancy is never perfectly foreseeable. When we have sexual intercourse, it is only possible but not necessary that we will have babies. In my opinion, if sexual intercourse will necessarily result in pregnancy, then parents should be perfectly responsible if they are voluntary and not ignorant of the result. If it is only possible to have pregnancy, then parents are still largely responsible. It is a very natural consequence to have baby after sexual intercourse. The burden of argument lies on those who think that the parents are not responsible. I will admit that there may be various degree of responsibility of mothers. I have so far argued that the parents are responsible but not only the mothers are responsible. It may be a natural inequality that only woman but not man will get pregnant but it is another matter to discuss. Also, there may be cases that the pregnant woman may not be so voluntary in the sexual intercourse, but was just pressed by their male partners to do so. In these cases, the responsibilities of the mothers may be less than those who engage in sex in fully voluntary considerations and therefore it may be not so unjust in adopting abortion. Sometimes it will be more unjust to withdraw help for the fetuses and sometimes it will be less unjust. Only in the case where there is no moral responsibility for the mother to the pregnancy that the withdrawal of help is not unjust. Thomson is right that sometimes it is difficult to determine the responsibility of mothers in actual cases, but after all if she really considers responsibility seriously as a consideration for the permissibility of abortion, then the burden of argument lies on her to show that pregnant mothers really have no moral responsibility for their fetuses. Moreover, if we really do not have the responsibility to take care of our children who are totally dependent on us for existence, and to look after them is just a virtue but not a responsibility, then it seems such moral standard is too low. It may imply that parents also do not have any moral responsibility to raise their young children when they are growing up and cannot live on themselves. Of course we seldom claim fetuses or young children have the right to be cared and concerned by us; yet, it seems we not only should care and concern them, but it is in fact our moral responsibility to look after them. Thomson does not argue whether fetuses have the right to be given subsistence from mothers�Xshe just claims that we cannot derive it from the right to life of fetuses. If she does not think there is such a right as justified by other reasons than the right to life, then it seems her account of right is not comprehensive. The vital interests of a weak group (the fetuses) are sacrificed for a stronger group (the mothers) in terms of physical and biological strength. If she thinks there is such a right for fetuses, her whole argument in ��A Defense of Abortion�� should be revised.

I will conclude that Thomson��s attempt to argue for the permissibility of abortion fails because (i) the right of life of fetuses does not entail that the mothers are morally responsible to provide their bodies for fetuses, but it also does not mean the mothers have no responsibility in not killing fetuses; and (ii) abortion has violated the right to life of fetus because it involves a withdrawal of help for and killing of the fetus unjustly due to the moral responsibility of mothers to fetuses. (i) and (ii) together show that the necessary and sufficient conditions of a right to abortion are not satisfied.

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