2004-02-03 - 11:13 p.m.

4.2 A Contractualist Account of Moral Motivation

To explain why we should take considerations of right and wrong seriously, apart from arguing that the ideal of mutual justifiability and recognition is important for us and we have strong reasons to attach priority to this ideal, we have to specify what in fact motivates us to act when we are moved by the considerations of right and wrong. We have to specify it, partly because ��moral motivation�� is an essential element in explaining how judgments of right and wrong can derive a reason-giving force for our reasons for actions, and partly because the complexities of this term can lead to interpretive disputes about the question ��why take right and wrong seriously?�� It may be suspicious to claim that we should take right and wrong seriously, if in fact the so-called ��moral motivation�� is such a mysterious notion that no one can explain how it works. In this section, I will describe how Scanlon settles this problem of moral motivation and examine some of the objections raised by his opponents.

The task of explaining moral motivation is a task of understanding the relationship between moral judgments and moral actions�Xmore specifically, the understanding of what reasons people have for honoring their moral duties and for acting morally. It is a matter of explaining how the fact that a certain action is wrong provides a reason not to do it. This is not an empirical task. If we took the task as explaining what considerations people in fact take when they are acting according to the demands of right and wrong, then we have to conclude that people in fact have various different ��moral motivations��: some may be moved by egoistic self-interests, some may be moved by a sense of altruistic desires, some may be moved just by a ��cold and strange�� imperative, and some may be moved by what Scanlon calls the contractualist ideal of mutual justification and recognition. For Scanlon, the task of explaining moral motivation is not to understand these diverse ��motivations��. The only target to be explained is the one that is connected with the content of and provides the normative basis for ��what we owe to each other���Xthe contractualist motivation for the ideal of mutual justification and recognition. (153, 189)

Now our project faces a difficult dilemma. On one hand, we cannot simply say the reason for being moral is the same reason as the one that makes an act wrong�X if the reason not to do the action is just that it is wrong, then it simply takes the reason-giving force of moral judgments for granted. We take the reasons for judging that a certain action is wrong as the reasons for not doing it, and it seems that this answer tells us nothing for a better understanding of the question of how considerations of right and wrong can move us to act. On the other hand, we also cannot appeal the reason of being moral solely to some non-moral reasons, for example to claim people have reasons to act morally because doing so would conduce to their self-interest�Xit seems we have appealed to the wrong kind of reason for being moral because someone who acts morally just out of self-interest is not a ��truly�� moral person. We do not suppose a moral person is first and foremost moved by these non-moral reasons when they act morally. This problem is named after H. A. Prichard, who described a similar problem in his earlier papers, as the Prichard��s dilemma. The two horns of the dilemma represent two extremes in approaching the question of ��why being moral?�� One appeals to what seem most obviously moral considerations, running the risk of triviality; the other appeals to what seem least connected with moral notions, running the risk of offering implausible external incentives for being moral. To provide a successful motivational basis for his account of ��what we owe to each other��, Scanlon must avoid the two extremes of the Prichard��s dilemma.

Scanlon��s strategy is to characterize more fully a substantive ideal of relations with others which is clearly connected with the content of ��what we owe to each other�� and at the same time has strong appeal when it is viewed independently. (155) His aim is to make clearer what this particular form of value is and to make its appeal more apparent in order to explain our moral motivation in terms of responding to this particular value. This is a substantive but not a formal account. The substantive value to which Scanlon appeals is what I call ��the ideal of mutual justification and recognition�� in the above section. It is this substantive value that gives rise to the contractualist motivation of justifying our actions to others. Someone who is moved by this ideal would find himself to have reason to justify his actions to others who is affected by his action. To put it in a more precise manner, let me restate it in a formula:

��to have the contractualist moral motivation is to be moved by the aim of finding and being able to justify one��s conduct by appeal to principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject.��

From the restatement of this formula, we can see how contractualist moral motivation is connected with the content of ��what we owe to each other��:

��an act is wrong if and only if it is disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis of informed, unforced general agreement.��

To see how this contractualist moral motivation works to move us to act according to ��what we owe to each other��, let��s consider someone who is motivated by the ideal of mutual justification and recognition. This moral motivation is not simply a motivation to act, analogous to a legal sanction, which is triggered by the conclusion that acting in a certain way would be morally wrong and then weighed against competing motives. Rather, Scanlon claims that this moral motivation starts when we begin to consider whether a certain act is right or wrong. The source of motivation�Xthe ideal of mutual justification and recognition�Xdoes not figure merely as a ��sanction�� that is triggered after deciding whether some act is right or wrong, it also provides a higher-order reason to shape our practical thinking about what is right and wrong. (155-156) In this sense, the reason to be moved by considerations of right and wrong, and also the reason to determine what principles would be disallowed in ��what we owe to each other��, both flow from the same more general reason: the reason we have to live with others on terms that they could not reasonably reject insofar as they are also motivated by this ideal. (154) We have reason to justify our actions to other because of the ideal of mutual justification and recognition, and this higher-order reason in turn gives reasons to determine which principles could be reasonably rejected, and at the same time gives reason for the agent to be moved by the considerations that these principles require. Moral motivation so characterized has a dual function: on one hand, it explains how we can be moved by considerations of right and wrong in practical reasoning; on the other, it also specifies the context which presupposes the range of reasons that are legitimate in rejecting principles, given the aim of finding mutually acceptable principles.

An advantage of this contractualist account of moral motivation over the ��sanction model��, as claimed by Scanlon, is that it can describe our moral experience more accurately. A good person is moved to do what ��what we owe to each other�� requires not only because ��it would be wrong otherwise�� but also because of more concrete considerations such as ��doing so will hurt someone��, or ��someone is counting on me��, or ��someone is in the position of help��. ��Particular right-making and wrong-making considerations such as these will be uppermost in the mind of a morally good agent on many occasions, with thoughts such as ��it would be wrong not to�� serving mainly as normative backstops in cases of temptation.�� Because these concrete considerations are numerous and diverse, and they may give rise to conflicting directives in particular occasions, we cannot simply identify moral motivation with recognizing the importance of and being moved by them. We need a process to decide which of these considerations are relevant in particular situation, and this process is shaped by the reason we have for mutual justification and recognition.

Two important remarks should be made before further discussion. First, the ideal of mutual justification and recognition is an ideal of hypothetical but not actual relations between individuals. The reason we have to want to be able to justify our actions to others on grounds that they could not reasonably reject (if they are similarly motivated) is different from the reason we have for wanting to be able to justify our actions to others on grounds that they actually accept. This ideal is seeking for a relation with others in which our actions can be justified to them if they are suitably motivated, but not for actual harmony with our fellow creatures (it is doubtful whether we can justify our actions to everyone in the actual world at all). It is obvious in many cases that acting morally would be contrary to the consensus of the majority; therefore actual agreement and actual recognition could not serve as the proper motivational basis of morality. Second, Scanlon��s contractualist account does not appeal moral motivation to a desire (a special psychological state) in seeking for unity with our fellow creatures. Moral motivation arises when we respond to the value of the contractualist ideal of mutual justification and recognition; it is explained in terms of our having a reason to justify our actions to others, but not our having a desire to be moved by this ideal when we are morally motivated. Scanlon holds this because he thinks ��insofar as ��having a desire�� is understood as a state that is distinct from ��seeing something as a reason,�� it plays almost no role in the justification and explanation of action�� (18) I will not drag in Scanlon��s arguments in the relationship between desire, reason and motivation. Here, it is clear enough to mention Scanlon��s main idea that moral motivation could be adequately explained with (i) the fact that people have reason to want to act in ways that could be justified to others, and (ii) the fact that when a rational person recognizes something as a reason we do not need a further explanation of how he or she could be moved to act on it. (154)

We can now examine how this contractualist account of moral motivation can provide a satisfactory answer to the Prichard��s dilemma. To Scanlon, this can be illustrated by an analogous dilemma in friendship:

��Instead of asking ��Why be moral?�� we might ask ��Why be loyal to one��s friend when this require sacrificing other goods?���K The answer, ��Because friendship requires it,�� seems to be no response at all to the question that is being asked. But if, on the other hand, we cite some value other than friendship�Xif, for example, we appeal to the benefits of having friends�Xthen this seems the wrong kind of response. A person who was ��loyal�� for that kind of reason would not be a good friend at all.��(161)

The right response to the dilemma involves characterizing friendship as a relationship desirable and admirable in itself, while at the same time it can bring about other benefits like companionship, encouragement and support. ��Being a friend�� involves recognizing friendship as an intrinsic value and respecting its demands as a sufficient reason to bear a burden; at the same time, it also involves enjoying those benefits come along with friendship. A person who was loyal to his friends simply to have benefits of friendship is not a true friend, and a person who did not enjoy friendship and regard it as a good to him is not a real friend either�Xhe is just following a strange and cold imperative. Friendship involves both feeling its demands and enjoying its benefits. (161-162)

The Prichard��s dilemma of ��why be moral�� can be resolved in a similar manner. The ideal of mutual justification and recognition has intrinsic value in itself, and at the same time it involves other benefits as well. Such an ideal is valuable in its own sake, and it gives reason for us to respect its demands independently�Xto act in a mutually justifiable manner. A truly moral person will respect his moral duties to others because ��it can be justified to others��; yet for him these requirements are not just formal imperatives, they are also aspects of a valuable way of living with others. The Prichard��s dilemma appears as a dilemma merely because it presents two aspects of a single value as competing answers to the same question. The ideal of mutual justification and recognition involves both recognizing its demands for its own sake ��because morality requires it�� and also enjoying those benefits that we can get from this ideal. This is why Scanlon describes such an ideal as one that is closely connected with the content of morality, thus providing independent reason for respecting our moral duties to others, and at the same time one that is closely connected with other goods, thus having strong appeal even when this ideal is considered from other perspectives. This avoids saying that we should respect our duties to others simply because the ideal of mutual justification and recognition requires us to do so, or saying that we should respect these duties only insofar as they conduce to the fulfilment of other goods. Our reasons of being moral is not instrumental in the sense that it only serves for some extra-goods apart from the contractualist ideal, and at the same time there are also some ��external incentives�� that can move us to take right and wrong seriously.

Scanlon does not argue explicitly why he thinks the ideal of mutual justification and recognition is intrinsically valuable�Xthat we have reason to care about and pursue this ideal for its own sake. He thinks it may be difficult to articulate an argument for this claim; and at best he can only try to describe it in a way that hopefully will make clear its appeal and clear out possible misunderstandings of it. (188) Acting in a way that is justifiable to others on grounds that they could not reasonably reject is indeed appealing to me, yet it is not unreasonable for others to doubt whether all of us really have strong reasons to attach to this ideal. Actual justification to and recognition by those living around us may be a strong motivation for some people to act accordingly, but is hypothetical justification to and recognition by reasonable people an equally powerful source of motivation? This doubt is manifested if we were aware of the fact that this ideal of mutual justification and recognition requires us to be moved by and even give priority to considerations of a large number of people, most of whom we will never have any actual contact at all. The motivational basis of friendship makes sense because friends do play an important role in one��s life; however, why should one care about his or her relations with all those whose life may be affected by his actions but cannot actually raise any complaint to him or her at all? (168) Here, I think Scanlon can appeal to the fact that we do care about whether we, as reasonable agents ourselves, are acting reasonably. We have stronger reason to care about whether our actions can justify to others who are reasonable than to care about whether people in the actual world, distorted by incomplete factual information or prejudiced by their vested-interests, do actually license us to do so. We have reasons to care about all people affected by our actions because there is no reason to discount their claim just because they would not have contact with us. These reflections show that we do have strong reasons to attach to the ideal of mutual justification and recognition, though it is hypothetical and involves innumerable people in nature. Scanlon��s arguments of importance and priority can also serve as supplementary arguments for this claim.

Even though we may concede that we do have strong reasons to attach to the ideal of mutual justification and recognition, Scanlon��s contractualist account of moral motivation still leaves a wide room for debate. Let��s consider some possible objections to his account here. I have selected three main objections and I will present them in terms of three questions respectively:

(1) Does the ideal of mutual justification and recognition really play the role as Scanlon describes in serving as the motivational basis of right and wrong?

One may have this question because phenomenologically speaking, it seems we seldom reflect to this ideal of relationship with others when we are moved by considerations of right and wrong. When we act according to morality of right and wrong, why suppose we are moved by the ideal of mutual justification and recognition but not other values? Why is our concern about considerations of right and wrong at base a concern about the justifiability of our actions to others but not a direct concern of the values of others�� lives? Is it more possible to claim that other people��s lives have value and that what a moral person is moved by is the recognition of that value? In this sense, justifiability may just play a secondary role. What is primary is the value of people��s lives which determines whether an act is justifiable. To say that a moral person cares about the justifiability of his or her actions is at best a roundabout way of saying that such a person is concerned to act in a way that is responsive to the value of others�� lives. If this claim is correct, then justification to others is not a necessary condition in motivating us to act morally. Moreover, as suggested by R. J. Wallace, if the real moral giving force of moral considerations is to be traced to the value of mutual justification and recognition, then processes of motivating reflection that exclude this value and feature in terms of more specific moral categories such as fairness, danger, harm and cruelty would look like forms of ��false consciousness��. It is notable that many people in fact motivate their actions through these specific moral categories such as ��doing so would be unfair�� or ��doing so would be cruel to him��. Phenomenological speaking, the ideal of mutual justification and recognition seems to play no role in the process of motivating our actions. We seldom resort directly to the ideal relations with others when we are moved to act rightly.

For the former problem, Scanlon claims that to respond to the value of human life is in fact one of the various aspects of the ideal of mutual justification and recognition. As mentioned in section 4.1, human beings are capable of assessing reasons and justifications, and proper respect for the distinctive value of human life involves treating them only in ways that they could, by proper exercise of this capacity, recognize as justifiable. (103-107, 169) What moves an agent to do the right thing involves respecting the value of other human lives, but this respect is in fact intrinsic to the ideal of mutual justification and recognition. Justification to others is still the basic condition that motivates an agent to do the right thing. For the latter problem, Scanlon can admit that there are occasions in which we are moved by concrete considerations like ��I don��t want to be cruel to them�� or ��doing so would be demeaning��, yet all these considerations are derivative from the more basic idea of justifiability to others. On Scanlon��s view, it is not the fact that a given act would be cruel or demeaning that moves an agent to act; rather, it is the fact that it would be reasonable for others (may be the victims) to object to that act that plays the central role in motivating our actions. As I have mentioned above, particular considerations are diverse and numerous, and they may give rise to different directives in particular situations. We cannot simply identify our moral motivation with these considerations without resorting to the more basic notion of justification to others. One more important point to note is that, given the aim of characterizing one possible ideal that we are responding to when we are moved by considerations of right and wrong, it is sufficient for Scanlon to provide us with an account which is intuitively possible and can avoid the Prichard��s dilemma�Xhe does not need to deny there are other possible accounts of moral motivation. In constructing a normative theory of right and wrong, what he needs to do is to silence reasonable doubts on how the proposed motivational basis could move us to act rightly. Therefore, the fact that we are phenomenologically moved by a diverse set of ��moral motivation�� is simply irrelevant to Scanlon��s argument.

(2) Is the ideal of mutual justification and recognition a value that everyone must recognize? Why must we be so motivated?

Some commentators question whether the ideal of mutual justification and recognition is a value that everyone must recognize. For example, Regina Kreide claims that if we are motivated to act morally because the ideal of mutual justification and recognition is part of our good life only, then Scanlon��s argument lacks the force that can make acting in accordance with this ideal an obligation to all. She thinks Scanlon at most can show we have strong reasons to appreciate and realize this value as part of our life plan but fails to explain why it is a value that all of us must recognize. In this sense, respecting moral duties is not itself a duty for agents and whether to act morally may be left open to agents, dependent barely on their the goodwill. Besides, if the fault of not being motivated to act morally is just that it is a failure to see the point of some reasons derived from an ideal of relationship with others, then it seems it is not a serious fault that would be ��punished�� by the society, just as the fault of breaking law would be punished by legal sanctions. Moral criticisms cannot give someone who is not motivated by that ideal a ��hard time�� because unless most of the people in the society are motivated by that ideal, he would not feel the loneliness of being isolated and ostracised. Moreover, the fact that he is being disapproved by those people whom he does not care about may not be a big deal to him because he can be unperturbed and just ignore how he is conceived in the eyes of those he find unimportant to him. He may just value being valued by those he values.

I think these objections are misfired. It is not clear what is required to make a motivation an obligation at all. At best what Scanlon can show is everyone does have good and strong reasons to pursue the ideal and therefore we have strong and good reason to be so motivated and do the right act. He has explicitly argued for this by characterizing the ideal of mutual justification and recognition as (i) something that is intrinsically valuable; and (ii) something that has strong appeal apart from its intrinsic value because it is closely connected with other goods in our lives. Of course there are in fact many people who cannot see the point of the ideal of mutual justification and recognition and therefore not motivated to act rightly; yet Scanlon��s task is not to formulate an argument that can ��necessarily�� convince these people but to present the reasons that he thinks convincing on us. If an agent really cares to live a good life, for the reasons (i) and (ii) above, this ideal would seem to be an ��essential�� ingredient in his life.

For the point of the authority or sanction of moral motivation, Scanlon can comfortably admit that moral motivation characterized by him is not similar to those actual legal sanctions in a society that can give morality-breakers a ��hard time�� because his account indeed does not base on actual consent of people in the society. Yet he has already argued convincingly for (i) the seriousness of the fault of failing to justify one��s actions based on reasons and (ii) the loss of not acting in accordance with considerations of right and wrong, by his argument of importance and argument of priority respectively. Failure to see the reasons behind right and wrong is not only ��missing something�� but is a fault equivalent to disrespecting the moral standing of other individuals; and an agent who fails to justify his actions to others would be ��punished�� in the sense that he cannot enjoy the benefits of this valuable relationship and also the pursuit of other values based on the footing of mutual justification and recognition. Another important point is, empirically speaking, even many people would not care in fact how others conceive them and whether they in fact approve their actions, most people would care whether their actions are approved by reasons. People may differ in their opinions in whether acting in a certain way is reasonable or not, but once they agree that it is not reasonable, they would express their disapproval through actual moral criticism. We do criticize vigorously those parents torturing their babies just for fun, and we do exert great pressure on them to change their behaviour. What we would reasonably reject is usually what most of us in fact reject. I do not aim to render morality to majority view. What I believe is most of us are reasonable and do care to act reasonably. Even someone who does not care about how the whole world thinks would care about how a reasonable being, if there were any, would think. I am confident and optimistic on this claim. If they do care about being reasonable, then a large number of people will be motivated by the ideal of mutual justification and recognition, and this number is large enough to form a ��moral community�� that can exert great pressure on those who does not care to justify their actions to others on terms that no one can reasonably reject.

(3) Do those who are not motivated by this ideal have any reason to respect our moral duties to others?

A related, and perhaps more pressing objection following question (2) is, for those who are not motivated by the ideal of mutual justification and recognition, is there any reason for them to respect those non-reasonably rejected principles agreed by people who are motivated by that ideal? Call these people ��the disaffected��: those who are not concerned with the ideal and indeed deny they have any reason to be so concerned. This question is not to ask whether those who are not motivated by this ideal indeed have any reason to be so motivated (this question is answered in question (2)), rather, it asks for whether those who are not motivated by this ideal do have any reason to act morally according to those principles agreed by those so motivated. For those who have the motivation to justify their actions to others, there is of course a reason for them to act in a mutually justifiable way; however, for those who do not share this ideal and motivation, do they really have the same reason as those who are so motivated in not doing the wrong act? Asking this question in another manner, why a hypothetical agreement of principles for general regulation of behaviour agreed by those motivated by the ideal of mutual justification and recognition is binding on those who are not so motivated? Scanlon can claim that these disaffected have reason to enter the agreement; but given the fact that they are not so motivated and not a member of the contracting party, why do they have reason to pay attention to the principles derived from this contract? The challenge proposed by this question of the disaffected is pressed on Scanlon by G. Dworkin:

��Why do we think that the disaffected have reasons to govern themselves by principles, which are ones that people who are differently motivated could not reasonably reject?... the disaffected could reasonably reject some principles that we could not reasonably reject. Since for Scanlon a claim about what it is reasonable to do is a claim about what one has most reason to do given a certain information and a specified class of reasons, ��it might be reasonable for a person who has no reason to care about justifiability to others to reject a principle just because he can, as a matter of bargaining strength or persuasive power, get the people who he is dealing with to accept a different principle that is more advantageous to him.���� (My emphasis)

Dworkin claims that any reason to act according to non-reasonably rejected principles (call this reason R) are conditional on the motivation to be moved by the ideal of mutual justification and recognition. Unless an agent is motivated to justify his or her actions to others, he or she does not have R. More precisely, if I interpret him correctly, he is claiming that unless an agent has the desire (in the broad sense) to be moved to justify his or her actions to others, he or she would not have R. I interpret him in this way because if he is just claiming that R is conditional on the motivation of an agent, then Scanlon can easily rebut his argument by claiming that we have a reason to be so motivated, and because of this reason agents do have R. Yet, if Dworkin��s claim is formulated in terms of the agent��s desire to be so motivated, then he can possibly deny Scanlon��s claim that those disaffected do have R. It is because he thinks that an agent has reason to do something only if the agent has the desire (a subjective motivational set) that will be served by doing so. In other words, all reasons for actions have subjective conditions, or in Bernard Williams�� terms, ��all external reasons claims are false, or incoherent, or really something else misleadingly expressed��. ��It is only those who enjoy the flavour of rhubarb that the presence of rhubarb on the menu gives reason to order it.��

Scanlon cannot resolve this problem simply by appealing to what he calls ��the generality of reasons judgements��. This notion only means that other people's reason to do X is dependent on some condition C being satisfied in their case if and only if our having that same reason depends on C being satisfied in our own case. Those disaffected may have the same reason as those who are motivated by the ideal of mutual justification and recognition to recognize that ideal because the reasons applying to those so motivated apply as well to those disaffected. Even if they are not so motivated, they still have the reason in pursing that ideal. Yet, it does not mean the reason for an agent motivated by that ideal in acting morally equally applies to those disaffected. The crucial point is whether the subjective motivation to be moved by the ideal of mutual justification and recognition is the condition C that our reasons to act morally depend. If it is the case�Xan agent��s reason to act morally is dependent on the condition that he has the subjective motivation or desire to be moved by the ideal of mutual justification and recognition, then those disaffected do not have this reason because this condition is not satisfied in the case for them.

I do not want to involve too many details in the debate between internal reasons and external reasons for action. Here, I would only raise some points which are relevant to the present discussion. The main argument for the internal reason claim (the claim that reasons for an agent to act is motivational-dependent or desire-dependent) is the idea that if something is a reason for an agent to do something, then this must be something that could be offered to the agent as advice; yet it just seems inappropriate (appears as mere browbeating) to offer as advice something that has no basis in that person's motivations. In his reply to Dworkin, Scanlon counter-argues that its being inappropriate to say something to a person just does not imply that what you would say is not good advice. Scanlon further argues that, under careful reflection, we would agree that the reasons for not killing others, or not being cruel to our spouses, do not depend on our happening to care about these things or having the desire to care about them. If we accept the internalist claim�Xwhether we have a reason to act morally depends on whether we have some appropriate elements in our subjective motivational set, then we have to accept the bizarre conclusion that our own reasons not to be cruel to our spouses or not to kill others are just contingent on the presence of appropriate elements in our subjective motivational set. This observation supports the claim that our reasons for acting morally do not merely depend on our happening to care about justifiability to others or our having the desire to be so motivated. Even for those who do not share the ideal of mutual justification and recognition, there are (external) reasons for them to act according to principles that no one could reasonably reject. They have reason to do so because they have reasons to be moved by the ideal of mutual justification and recognition, and these reasons in turn give rise to the reason to act according to those non-reasonably rejected principles.

Scanlon does not need to embrace the more extreme position that all internal reasons claims are false and only external reasons claims are legitimate. He is not going to deny the possibility of all internal reasons claims. He only tries to defend his position that it is sensible to claim that those disaffected do have a reason (external reason in this sense) for acting according to those non-reasonably rejected principles. Yet, even if he accepts the internalists�� claim that the ��external�� reason for being moral is not a legitimate reason for those disaffected (because there is no desire to be moved by that ��external reason�� in the subjective motivational set of those disaffected), he still thinks his thesis would not be undermined. Even defenders of internal reasons would have to admit that failure to see the force of considerations that drive an agent to act morally is a serious deficiency on an agent��s part, no matter whether it is because the agent could not be brought to recognize that he or she has a reason (which may be due to some cognitive or psychological disabilities) or because the agent just refuses to recognize them. A child who is cruel to his friends in class because he does not understand what is ��cruel�� do not have a subjective motivational set not to do so at that moment; nevertheless, an internalist would also agree that he should change his subjective motivational set and stop being cruel to his friends. ��Cruelty, for example, involves a failure to see other people's pain as something one has a reason to avoid. If cruelty is a deficiency, this must be because the pain of others is in fact a reason�Xa consideration that counts against the cruel person's acting in certain ways�Xeven though he or she (being cruel) fails to be moved by it.�� The subjective motivational set of an agent must undergo a process of modification in order for him to be moved by the considerations that he is in the position to appreciate. Scanlon calls this process ��reflective modification�� of one��s subjective motivational set. If those internalists admit that failure to see the force of those ��reasons�� (or what they would call ��considerations�� external to the agent) is a serious deficiency of the agent and therefore he should have a ��reflective modification�� of his subjective desires and motivational set to respond to these considerations, then there is in fact no real disagreement between Scanlon and those internalists in the present context. If Dworkin agrees that it is a deficiency for an agent to fail to be moved by these considerations, and what he should do is to change his subjective motivational set, then he would also agree that there are in fact compelling considerations for those disaffected to be so moved. The only difference between an internalist and an externalist may just be that the internalist would be reluctant to use the term ��reasons�� to refer to what he would call ��external considerations�� for those disaffected. They may disagree over whether the reason applied to a person moved by the contractualist ideal would also be applied to a ��disaffected��, yet, they would agree the ��disaffected�� should undergo a process of ��reflective modification�� to respond to the considerations that the ��disaffected�� is in the position to respond.

I think Scanlon��s defence is convincing because he has indeed argued in details that there are compelling ��external considerations�� or what he prefers to call ��reasons�� for the ��disaffected�� to care about those non-reasonably rejected principles. It should be noted that Scanlon��s aim is not to show every rational person must be committed to the ideal of mutual justification and the contractualist moral motivation. (187) As I have argued at the very beginning of this chapter, what we are looking for is not a justification for morality of right and wrong that everyone, including an amoralist, would accept and recognize. If it is our task, we have to begin with something that every one of us would concern and argue that all people having this concern are committed to act morally. In fact, Scanlon himself doubts whether such a justification is always available. (148) What he needs to do is to characterize what exactly motivates us to act according to ��what we owe to each other�� and explain in detail why we have strong reason to be so motivated in order to settle reasonable doubt on the motivational basis of his account. I have elaborated his arguments for the importance and priority of moral considerations in 4.1, arguing that considerations of right and wrong indeed have an important role in practical decision making both from an agent-neutral and agent-centred standpoint. I have also describe how the ideal of mutual justification and recognition works as the motivational basis of ��what we owe to each other�� throughout this section. I hope my interpretation of his account is clear enough to rebut most of its objections.

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