2004-02-03 - 10:47 p.m.

Here comes Chapter 4, a chapter that concerns moral motivation and normativity of moral judgments. I was more ambitious and wanted to adress the boarder question 'why should we be moral?' at first. Nevertheless, this attempt was aborted because I wanted to focus on Scanlon's own account of moral reasons and motivations. This is not easy neither-- Scanlon's own account is under heavy criticism by other philosophers and my task is to defend for his positions, not only by clarifying his arguments but sometimes even to amend them. I do think it is a well-written chapter, partly because it was written in Macau when I was having a holiday (thus in a good mood), partly (and more importantly) because of Scanlon's impressive, critical but contentious initial arguments. This chapter is particularly devoted to Marianna Tsien.

Chapter 4

Taking right and wrong seriously

As I have argued in chapter 3, ��what we owe to each other�� represents an important domain, or what Shelly Kagan calls a ��morally significant factor�� within the broader concept of ��morality��. Scanlon calls this domain the ��morality of right and wrong��. (6) In this chapter, I will address the further question of why we should take this morally significant factor seriously. Given that it is only one part of morality, it is normal to ask, ��why should we pay special attention to this domain when it conflicts with other considerations that are important in our lives?�� There would be many occasions in which ��what we owe to each others�� might come into conflict with other domains ��within�� morality; and even if in some occasions there is no conflict between different domains ��within�� morality, there may still be some non-moral considerations that count against acting morally. What justifies our respect of, and giving priority to ��what we owe to each other�� in moral reasoning and practical decision making? Scanlon addresses this problem in terms of the reason-giving and motivational force of our moral judgments of right and wrong. (147) In section 4.1, I will summarize and criticize Scanlon��s main argument in characterizing the relationship between ��what we owe to each other�� and other values or domains within ��morality��. He thinks it is reasonable to claim that ��what we owe to each other�� usually demands a priority over other values. On the other hand, apart from arguing that it is usually a prior value ��across�� morality, Scanlon also tries to argue that the special importance of ��what we owe to each other�� in our life, when considered alone, can give us very strong reason in respecting our moral duties to others and acting towards the ideal of mutual justification and recognition. In section 4.2, I will explicate Scanlon��s contractualist account of moral motivation and discuss some of its main objections. I will explain why I think the objections made do not undermine its claim to be a feasible account of moral motivation.

4.1 Priority and Importance of Right and Wrong

Why take right and wrong seriously? It is not merely a question of self-understanding, asking for reasons why we think some acts are right or wrong. What we want to know is not merely what we care about when we care about right and wrong but why this is something we must care about. Nor is it a question of justification, asking for further or additional justifications for right and wrong apart from the reasons we have for judging that some acts are right or wrong. That would suggest that those who already care about right and wrong should abandon their concern unless some further reasons apart from the reasons of right and wrong could be provided. Rather than a pseudo question of self-understanding and a misleading question of justification, Scanlon thinks it is a question asking for a fuller explanation of the reason-giving and motivational force of judgments of right and wrong. (147-148) It asks how reasons for moral judgments derives their special force among our reasons for actions. To Scanlon, this can be separated into two sub-questions: namely the question of importance and the question of priority. The question of importance is this: why does failure to see and to be moved by the reason-giving force of considerations of right and wrong strike us as a particularly serious fault? Is it a case of irrationality or it is a case of violating some important values in our life? For the question of priority, if we also recognize the importance of other values seriously, why right and wrong always or almost always take precedence over these other values? Why does ��what we owe to each other�� usually deserve priority in our practical thinking? The former question concerns the significance for a third party of the fact that an agent does or does not take considerations of right and wrong seriously; and the latter question concerns the kind of role considerations of right and wrong can play in the thinking of an agent. The moral ��must�� is explained in terms of the importance and priority of judgments of right and wrong. (148-149)

I will first address the less complicated argument for the question of importance. To Scanlon, it is a question about why the failure to be moved by considerations of right and wrong strikes us as a particularly significant kind of shortcoming, different from the failure to be moved by reasons of other kinds. His aim is to explain the special significance for us of someone��s failing to be moved by ��what we owe to each other��. (159) I have mentioned in Chapter 2 what Scanlon calls the ��generality of reasons requirement��: unless someone��s situation is different from ours in ways that are morally relevant, the moral reasons that apply to us must apply to him or her as well. (73-74) In this sense, the moral reasons that apply to us would also apply to an amoralist�Xsomeone who can see the difference between right and wrong but failed to be moved by them or even deny there is any reason to care about it. (158) Reasons are not conditional on the subjective tastes of individuals. Following this assertion, the importance of the morality of right and wrong would become clear once we grasp the content of ��what we owe to each other���Xan act is right or wrong iff it is disallowed by non-reasonably rejected principles. This provides a reason for everyone to follow the guidelines of ��what we owe to each other��. In this sense, an amoralist who disregards the demands of ��what we owe to each other�� does fail to see the point of a reason that applies to him or her. (158)

An amoralist who fails to appreciate the reason behind right and wrong would be different from those who fail to respond to other values like artistic satisfactions or historical understanding. An amoralist does not only ��miss something�� in the sense that he fails to value something worth valuing and as a result his life is being less flourishing; more importantly, he also fails to see the need to justify his actions to other individuals whose justification is owed just in virtue of being a person. This is equivalent to disrespecting our moral standing as persons. ��Human beings are capable of assessing reasons and justifications, and proper respect for their distinctive value involves treating them only in ways that they could, by proper exercise of this capacity, recognize as justifiable.��(169)

It would be underestimating the significance on us to say this failure is just a failure in missing something valuable in our lives because it would have immediate implications for our relations with the amoral agent. If someone cannot see the point of philosophy, then his relations with those who love it may be affected, but this effect is usually localized and would leave much of his life untouched. Yet, the effects of a failure to be moved by considerations of right and wrong would not be confined in this way. This effect is fundamental in the sense that it represents an unbridgeable gulf between amoral agents and all those who must live and interact with them. Such an unbridgeable gulf is a result of the amoralist��s ultimate attitude towards not only us but everyone else as well. ��The gulf would of course be widest in the case of a person who saw no reason to treat us in any way other than that which best suited his private interests.��(390, n.14) Even for an enthusiastic religious believer who feels separated from unbelievers by their religious beliefs, this separation would not be unbridgeable unless the believer feels that denying his religion involves denying his moral standing as a person as well. Being an amoralist, however, would involve such kind of denial of our moral standing. This accounts for the particular significance on us for someone else��s failure to be moved by considerations of right and wrong. (158-160)

Scanlon��s argument for the importance of considerations of right and wrong is sound so long as he limits his target to explaining the particular fault of failing to be moved by ��what we owe to each other�� and its significance on a third party. ��I should emphasize that what I am trying to explain here is not the special stringency of moral considerations�Xsome special rational force�Xthat moral reasons have over the agents to whom they apply, but rather the special significance for us of someone��s failing to be moved by these reasons.�� (159) Scanlon��s argument for the importance of right and wrong, however, may seem unsatisfactory to some critics. It may not be able to convince an agent to take the considerations of right and wrong seriously since the reason being given to explain the importance of ��what we owe to each other�� is not the one that comes from an agent-relative standpoint. As an agent myself, what considerations can count for my acting according to morality of right and wrong? Scanlon may be quite right that his task is not to justify ��what we owe to each other�� to an amoralist; (390, n.12) but if he really wants to strength the claim that we should take considerations of right and wrong seriously, he has to supplement his argument of importance by his argument of priority, which argues for the priority of right and wrong over other values from the agent��s point of view.

Scanlon��s basic approach to the question of priority is to articulate a general framework characterizing the relation between ��what we owe to each other�� and other kinds of reasons and values with which they might seem to come into conflict. ��What we owe to each other�� may come into conflict with other values in two senses. First, they may conflict in a ��practical�� sense that they give rise to incompatible demands for an action. Second, even if they were not in conflict in the first sense, they can conflict in a deeper sense when some other values involve giving certain considerations a status of reasons that ��what we owe to each other�� rules out. Since the morality of right and wrong involves very general requirements governing the reasons that we can accept, it may conflict with many other values in this second, deeper sense. (160)

One obvious example that can illustrate this conflict may be the conflict between ��what we owe to each other�� and what Bernard Williams calls our ��projects��: the interests and activities that define our deepest sense of self and constitute our characters, for example our friendships with others and personal or professional ambitions. Williams suggests that in a case in which one could only save one of two people, it would be contrary to the requirement of morality to save one of them because of some special ties, for example he is your friend or your spouse. This suggests that a morality that requires this kind of strict impartiality would declare love and friendship to be impermissible as reasons for saving one person rather than another. To Williams, this would rule out love and friendship altogether, since these values recognize the special ties with one of the person as a reason to save him, but this reason is ruled out as a reason in the morality of right and wrong. This is not only a case of practical conflict; it is also a conflict in terms of whether certain reasons can be regarded as legitimate in practical decisions.

William��s argument can be disarmed simply by denying that morality would in fact require this kind of strict impartiality and it would rule out the reasons provided by love and friendship. Actually, Scanlon has employed it as the first strategy of his three-step argument in addressing the problem of priority. As I have already stated in Chapter 2, reasons provided by love or friendship can play a role in shaping the non-reasonably rejectable principles in particular cases. An individual has good reasons in rejecting principles that make it impossible for him to recognize other values that he has good reason to recognize. (218-219) Therefore, love and friendship and indeed other kinds of personal projects do play a role in deciding ��what we owe to each other��. This is Scanlon��s first response towards the problem of priority: to argue that ��what we owe to each other�� in fact can leave room for the pursuit of individual projects that is important in our lives, insofar as it would be reasonable to reject principles that do not allow for such pursuit. (160-161) In this sense, ��what we owe to each other�� can at least accommodate some of the appeal to personal projects and other values. There will be limits for this accommodation, however, because it is still possible to have these reasons and values to be undermined by other (individual) reasons in some occasions. For example, to favor a friend because of special tie in a distribution of public welfare would be ruled out as a legitimate reason to do so under ��what we owe to each other��. This is because the reason derived from friendship is outweighed by the reasons of other individuals in claiming for fair and just distribution. ��What we owe to each other�� and friendship may still conflict in the practical sense that they give rise to incompatible demands for actions. Therefore, the first response can reduce but not eliminate the potential conflict between ��what we owe to each other�� and other values.

Scanlon realizes the inadequacy of the first part of his three-step strategy and he tries to supplement this by his second step of argument. He tries to argue that values other than ��what we owe to each other��, if properly understood, would have a ��built-in sensitivity�� to the demands of ��what we owe to each other��. (161, 165) Again, Scanlon resorts to friendship as an example:

��Friendship, at least as I understand it, involves recognizing the friend as a separate person with moral standing�Xas someone to whom justification is owed in his or her own right, not merely in virtue of being a friend. A person who saw only friends as having this status would therefore not have friends in the sense I am describing: their moral standing would be too dependent on the contingent fact of his affection.�� (164)

Scanlon tries to claim that a ��friend�� who steals a kidney for you if you need one is not a real friend because your moral standing is respected by him only because of the contingent fact that he likes you. His action has revealed his view of your right to your own body parts: he would not steal them, but that is just because he happens to like you. What this kidney example tries to show is that friendship requires us to recognize our friend as having moral standing as persons, independent of our affection to him; and it in turn places limits on our behavior. Genuine friendship in itself is an inherently moral form of relationship, therefore its conflict with ��what we owe to each other�� is more apparent than real. If friendship that we have most reasons to value involves recognizing the moral claims of friends qua persons (and hence the moral claims of non-friends as well), there would be no sacrifice of friendship if I refuse to violate the rights of strangers in order to help my friend. The same example can be extended to all those values in which personal relations with others are of our central concern, including family members and lovers. (165-166) To strengthen this second step of his argument, Scanlon also mentions the value of scientific accomplishments and other forms of excellences. Values in these collective human activities, similar to friendship, are also sensitive to the requirements of our justifiability to others. A scientist who violates his moral duties to others in order to strive for more money for research would fail to see the point and value of scientific investigation�Xscience is a collective undertaking by a community over time, and its success depends on the truthfulness and sincerity of its participants. (166-167)

By assuring ��what we owe to each other�� does leave sufficient room for other values (step one) and at the same time that other values do have a built-in sensitivity to ��what we owe to each other�� (step two), Scanlon characterizes the relationship between ��what we owe to each other�� and other ��moralized�� versions of values as mutually compatible�Xon one hand, ��what we owe to each other�� can accommodate the pursuit of other values; and on the other, values that we have most reasons to pursue are those which can satisfy the demands of ��what we owe to each other��. In Scanlon��s own words, these values ��are both shaped by it (��what we owe to each other��) and shape it in turn��. (174) His aim is to minimize the possible range of cases in which ��what we owe to each other�� may come into conflict with other values. By the combination of step one and step two, he hopes most cases in which there may be a seeming conflict between ��what we owe to each other�� and other values can be resolved without resorting to the third step of his argument.

Scanlon does admit that there are possibilities for other forms of ��friendship�� or values apart from the ��moralized�� versions portrayed by him. Scanlon claims, ��I need not deny that there are other conceptions of friendship�Kwhich do not have the character just described�� because his aim is only to argue ��friendship�� that we have most reasons to pursue is not incompatible with ��what we owe to each other��. (165) For example, a person may concede the value of standing in the relation of mutual justification with his friends but wonder whether their friendship really requires him to value this kind of relationship with some strangers altogether, especially with those they find neither appealing nor admirable. Moreover, as suggested by Scanlon himself, whether this kind of ��moralized�� version of friendship exists depends greatly on the society in which one lives. ��If no one in my society understands friendship as having the moral content I have just described, then a relationship with others on this footing is not available to me.�� (166) The existence of some ��non-moralized�� forms of friendship, and indeed of other values, forces Scanlon to take the last step of his three-step argument: by appealing directly to the great importance of the value of mutual justification and thus mutual recognition between individuals. According to Scanlon, it is in fact a ��head-to-head�� comparison between the importances of the competing values. He recognizes that the ideal of mutual justifiability and recognition among individuals is a valuable form of relationship; and because of this, we always have very strong reason to pursue this ideal even if sometimes our personal projects or other goods would be sacrificed by complying to the requirements of ��what we owe to each other��. I have discussed the importance of this ideal in a third-person perspective already. This can support the claim that the ideal of mutual justification is indeed an important value to all of us. However, this claim does not provide us with the base on which this ideal and other values could be compared from an agent��s point of view. Even after careful examination, I cannot find any hint in Scanlon��s text (including both his book and later papers) of how to carry out the comparison between conflicting values�Xapart from appealing to reflection�Xthat can support Scanlon��s conclusion that mutual justification is always a more important value to an agent and morality of right and wrong always deserves priority over other considerations. This lack of comparable standard is a hidden loophole in Scanlon��s argument and I will discuss it in the following paragraphs. Here, it is clear enough to show Scanlon��s general idea that comparison is to be made at the final stage of practical decision making for an agent.

Generally speaking, Scanlon��s three-step argument is a sophisticated attempt to address the question of priority for ��what we owe to each other�� over other values. First, he tries to argue that morality of right and wrong does leave room for other values; and second, he goes on to argue that other values, with their built-in sensitivity to right and wrong, would also pay attention to the demands of ��what we owe to each other�� to a certain extent. Finally, he appeals to the importance we attach to the ideal of mutual justification and recognition, which he believes it can explain why we always or almost always should give considerations of right and wrong priority. Scanlon is right if ��what we owe to each other�� and other ��moralized�� versions of values are mutually compatible, and if the only possible candidates that can conflict with ��what we owe to each other�� are other ��non-moralized�� forms of values, then usually we have stronger reasons to attach to ��what we owe to each other�� rather than to these values. However, Scanlon��s three-step strategy is not as watertight as he thinks of. Let me examine some possible considerations now.

Step one (to argue that ��what we owe to each other�� does leave room for the pursuit of other values) can possibly keep standing under close examination. Nevertheless, as noted by Scanlon, this step is not sufficient in itself to establish the claim that we should give priority to ��what we owe to each other�� over other values. The crucial point is not whether ��what we owe to each other�� does leave room for other values but rather whether it would never conflict with other values; and the answer is obviously ��no�� following my argument above. Step two is more controversial. In arguing that there are some ��moralized�� versions of values that is compatible with ��what we owe to each other��, Scanlon seems to suggest that the values of friendship or scientific accomplishments are dependent on their conforming to the demands of ��what we owe to each other��. We have reason to pursue friendship or scientific accomplishments only if the pursuing would be limited by ��what we owe to each other��. This would altogether rule out those ��non-moralized�� versions of values, since if the values of friendship or scientific accomplishments are dependent on their ��moralized�� structure, then ��non-moralized�� friendship or ��non-moralized�� scientific accomplishments are simply not valuable. Let me call this dependent thesis claim (i). Claim (i) is an aggressive claim because it suggests there is in fact no genuine conflict between ��what we owe to each other�� and other values that we have reasons to pursue. This claim can probably bridge up the gap between ��what we owe to each other�� and other values left by step one. Yet, as Scanlon himself realizes, this claim is not likely to be correct. As for friendship, apart from treating friends as separate moral persons at least, it is also crucial to friendship ��that we are moved to do things for a friend by the special affection and regard that we hold for him or her as a friend, not simply by consideration of a kind that we owe to everyone.�� (My emphasis) (165, 172-173) Friendship in a certain sense involves doing things required by it just because ��he or she is my friend�� or just because ��I like him��. It is even more suspicious to claim that the value of scientific accomplishments is just dependent on those achievements obtained without violating the morality of right and wrong. We can imagine an ambitious but selfish scientist who enjoys scientific discoveries very much but is unwilling to share his works with his colleagues and students. The value of his work does not come from the fact that his work does not violate any demands of ��what we owe to each other��. These examples show that the values of ��friendship�� and ��scientific accomplishments�� are not wholly dependent on their ��built-in sensitivity�� to the demands of ��what we owe to each other��. The values of ��friendship��, ��scientific accomplishments��, and in fact many other values, including both their ��moralized�� and ��non-moralized�� versions, depend on something else instead.

Scanlon should not be blamed for the failure of claim (i). In fact, he has never adopted this more aggressive claim but just proceeds with a careful claim that we have more reasons to pursue the ��moralized�� versions of different values and these ��moralized�� versions of values are compatible with ��what we owe to each other��. So far he has only claimed that the values of friendship or scientific accomplishments may be undermined if they break our moral duties to others, but not that their values are wholly dependent on their conforming to these duties. In his reply to R. J. Wallace, he admits that his aim is not to rule out those ��non-moralized�� versions of values but just to characterize a version of friendship or scientific accomplishment that we have more reasons to pursue:

��One thing I said was that if my claims about the self-limiting character of this particular form of friendship are correct, then there is at least one form of friendship worth valuing that contractualist morality does not rule out. I think this is a point worth making, ... If successful, this argument rebuts the charge that a commitment to the priority of moral requirements would impoverish our lives by depriving us of the possibility of having friendships worthy of the name.��

Let me call this claim (ii), which is more conservative in character. Claim (ii) can possibly avoid the counter-examples of claim (i) because Scanlon allows there are also some ��non-moralized�� versions of values that we have reasons to value. The weakness of this claim, however, lies on its inability to bridge the gap between ��what we owe to each other�� and other values left by step one, and therefore leaves room for ��head-to head�� comparison of the importance between ��what we owe to each other�� and those ��non-moralized�� versions of values in step three. Scanlon claims that insofar as they are ��non-moralized�� versions of values, we can claim that the importance of ��what we owe to each other�� can outweigh the importance of these values in step three. In answering R. J. Wallace��s doubt in why giving priority to ��what we owe to each other�� over those values that do not have a ��built-in sensitivity�� to morality, he argues:

��here I think I have to fall back on a combination of the second strategy with the third, and argue (1) that the form of friendship we have most reason to value is this "moralized" version, which does not make demands that are inconsistent with contractualist morality, and (2) that other forms of friendship, which do make such demands, are for that reason less worthy of being valued and ought therefore to be sacrificed when conflicts with morality arise.��

This argument is obviously circular. Scanlon tries to assert that ��what we owe to each other�� is more important than other forms of ��non-moralized�� values when conflicts arise because we have more reasons to pursue those ��moralized�� forms of values than those ��non-moralized�� forms of values; and ��non-moralized�� values can at most be less valuable forms of values and therefore ought to be sacrificed. This point is particularly apparent when Scanlon claims that ��non-moralized�� values ��are for that reason less worthy of being valued��. ��What we owe to each other�� can outweigh those ��non-moralized�� values because ��non-moralized�� values are less valuable, but why are they less valuable? ��Because they are not ��moralized�� values that are compatible with our moral duties to others.�� Circular! Why we have more reasons to pursue ��moralized�� values but not ��non-moralized�� values? Why are ��non-moralized�� friendship and scientific accomplishments less valuable than friendship and scientific accomplishments that conform with right and wrong? Scanlon does not give any independent argument here. If ��non-moralized�� values are less valuable than their ��moralized�� counterparts just for the reason that they are ��non-moralized��, then Scanlon��s whole argument is question-begging in the sense that the importance of ��what we owe to each other�� and hence the ��built-in sensitivity�� of values are intruded into the values themselves, which is in turn used to explain why ��what we owe to each other�� can outweigh the importance of those ��non-moralized�� values in step three. R. J. Wallace also agrees that this argument is question-begging ��in the context of a demonstration of the priority of moral reasons�� To argue for the priority of ��what we owe to each other�� over other values, what Scanlon needs to show is from the deliberative perspective of an agent, what he has most reasons to do is to act according to ��what we owe to each other�� but not to other values, especially to his personal projects that give meanings and satisfactions to his own life. The failure of claim (ii) unveils the concealed weakness of step three in his three-part argument, namely he does not provide any independent standard in weighing the importance of different values for ��head-to-head comparison�� between the ideal of justifiability to others and other ��non-moralized�� values (the only possible candidate that can conflict with ��what we owe to each other��); and therefore fails to provide a reason for an agent to choose to act according to ��what we owe to each other�� rather than to act according to other personal values in the final decision-making stage of step three. In fact, if we consider a person who is very concerned about his own projects and put great emphasis on them, the idealized value of mutual justification and recognition would seem rather cold and bloodless, comparing with the warmth and emotions in the pursuit of his own projects.

To resolve the deadlock, Scanlon may concede that the problem of priority is not addressed to those who hold ��non-moralized�� versions of values, and hence his three-step argument is only applicable to those who hold ��moralized�� versions of different values, thus maintaining the consistency of his three-step argument. Yet, this move abandons the specific attractiveness of his argument in priority, namely that considerations of ��what we owe to each other�� is prior to other values from the first-person perspective of an agent himself or herself. This would render Scanlon��s argument in priority to the same weakness of the argument in importance�Xmay be not powerful enough to convince an agent to take ��what we owe to each other�� seriously. Alternatively, Scanlon may also try another amendment for his three-step argument�Xone that is more progressive: to argue that even ��non-moralized�� values can emerge in the final stage of decision in step three, upon reflection, their importance would probably be outweighed by the importance of the ideal of justifiability to others. The greater importance of this ideal can be appealed to our intuitions when we reflect upon their relative importance. However, this would not be a satisfactory nor acceptable answer for many of us because the notions ��reflections�� or ��intuitions�� are themselves very vague. They need better qualifications if not justifications.

It may be useful here to consider R. J. Wallace��s proposal in reconstructing Scanlon��s response to the question of priority. He appeals to the particular points and importance of our personal projects and other personal values in order to explain the greater importance of mutual justification and recognition. These personal values are appealing to us as agents because they ��can contribute directly to making our lives good from our point of view.�� The ideal of mutual justification and recognition, as a matter of fact, could also serve well for these purposes and ends convincingly. Agents could attain a distinctive moral standing when they do the right thing, ��rendering themselves fit to participate in relationships with others on grounds of mutual recognition. This may be understood as a specific way in which the agent��s life is made better or more worthy, from their own point of view�� This provides a basis for comparison between different values in the final stage of decision in step three of the three-step argument. If the ideal of mutual justification and recognition is to be compared with other values in terms of their contribution to a better life for an agent, then this ideal can possibly take a priority role because it represents a way in which the agent could live peacefully and cooperatively with other individuals. This relationship is basic to his own pursuit of other personal values. It does not mean that the values of other personal values, such as friendship and scientific accomplishments, are dependent on the values of the ideal of mutual justification and recognition, or else it would follow the same mistake of the aggressive claim (i). The ideal of mutual justification and recognition can contribute to the pursuit of other personal values, but it does not constitute them. This argument does not render the ideal of mutual justification and recognition to an instrumental value only. We still have reasons to pursue this ideal for its own sake; the point is only that even if the ideal is compared with other values in terms of their contribution to a better life, this ideal still deserves a priority in decision-making because they provide the necessary footings for the pursuit of other values. In this sense, the ideal of mutual justification and recognition represents a master-value governing all values that concern or involve inter-personal relationships between individuals. This argument is further supported by step one of Scanlon��s three-step strategy: the fact that ��what we owe to each other�� does leave room for the pursuit of other personal values. We therefore have a strong reason to recognize and give priority to the demands of ��what we owe to each other�� over other personal values in practical decision-making.

I conclude that the ideal of mutual justification and recognition should be given priority to other values that involves inter-personal relationships with other individuals because this way of life can facilitate our pursuit of other values and may even be necessary for these pursuits in some occasions. I am not sure whether there is any value that does not involve this kind of inter-personal relationships in its broad sense. Nevertheless, I think my argument is sufficient to establish the claim that we should take the morality of right and wrong seriously. I will go on to discuss the ��motivational�� aspects of this ideal in the next section.

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