2004-03-20 - 5:34 p.m.

5.2 Contractualism and Moral Status

In Section 5.1, I addressed a question which can broadly be conceived as a question concerning the scope of ��what we owe to each other�� within ��morality��. In this section, I will shift my focus from the boundary of the morality of right and wrong to the range of creatures who possess moral status in this particular domain. To ask for the range of creatures who possess moral status in this domain is to ask who can possess a legitimate moral claim against others�� actions in the morality of right and wrong. Contractualism locates the motivational basis of ��what we owe to each other�� on mutual justification, but to whom is this justification owed? Who can be wronged in the sense of ��what we owe to each other��? We have to specify the range of creatures who can legitimately reject or support proposed principles. More generally speaking, this question of moral status is another part of the question of the scope of ��what we owe to each other��, concerning the range of creatures who are ��covered�� and ��protected�� by this particular domain.

��Moral status�� is an important notion in contemporary applied ethics. Disagreements in a number of important moral issues partly turns out to be disagreements over what kinds of creature can possess moral status. To give a few but famous examples, they include: (i) the right and wrong of abortion, which partly depends on whether a fetus should be considered as a person; (ii) the debate over animal rights and appropriate treatment of animals, which depends on why and how animals�� interests are counted morally, and whether animals possess equal moral status with that of human beings; and (iii) environmental ethics, which concerns the moral status of natural objects and also involves the possible claims of our future generations. A normative theory may not be able to settle all these questions immediately�Xits task is not to answer whether those beings in the above questions do possess moral status. Yet, any plausible normative theory must also address the question of moral status, at least in providing clearer standards in assigning moral status to different beings. To be a complete philosophical account of the morality of right and wrong, contractualism has to ��provide some basis for understanding what this disagreement is about�� and explain ��why some answers seem plausible while others are definitely ruled out��. (177)

Roughly speaking, to have moral status is to be ��counted morally�� for one��s own sake but not merely for his instrumental value in moral deliberation or evaluation. Different theories may have different standard in ascribing moral status to beings. For example, for utilitarian, the standard in ascribing moral status to a being is whether the being is sentient. Bentham has famously claimed that the standard is not whether the being can reason or can talk, but whether the being can suffer. Kantian or rights-based theories, on the other hand, typically hold that a being would have moral status if it possesses some kind of rationality. Apart from different standards in assigning moral status, the question is complicated by the fact that ��moral status�� may not be an all-or-nothing thing. There may be degrees of moral status and even different kinds of moral status. It is therefore possible to claim that while animals or natural objects do not possess equal moral status with human beings, their claims are still legitimate to be ��counted morally�� in moral deliberation and evaluation. Given this complicated understanding of ��moral status��, any account attempting to explain the standards in assigning moral status is bound to be controversial.

Before examining Scanlon��s own account of moral status, one ambiguity in his normative account of right and wrong has to be resolved. According to contractualism, an act is wrong if and only if it is disallowed by principles that could not be reasonably rejected by people who were moved to find principles for the general regulation of behaviour that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject. (4) As Thomas Pogge points out, this formulation would invite uncertainty in the kind of person to whom justification is owed:

��Read literally, Scanlon��s formulas are morally appalling. To avoid acting wrongly, and to be a CMM (Contractualist Morally Motivated) person, one must be concerned to avoid the possibility of reasonable rejection by other CMM persons. One need not be concerned to avoid reasonable rejectability by those whose compliance with their duties to others is motivated differently (e,g., in a religious or utilitarian manner)�Xno matter how strong grounds such others may have for rejecting the principle one invokes in justification of one��s conduct.��(My emphasis)

Pogge is right that if reasonably rejected and non-reasonably rejected principles are to be determined only by beings who are similarly motivated by the contractualist moral motivation, then those who are moved to obey their duties by other motivations, including those who are motivated by ��God commands�� or just by self-interests, are excluded from the kind of being who can raise legitimate rejection to principles. In this sense, their moral standing is denied in ��what we owe to each other�� because they are not ��counted morally�� unless they are contractualist morally motivated. Pogge realizes that it is not the correct interpretation of Scanlon��s contractualist formula. To avoid ambiguity, he suggests Scanlon should specify clearly that reasonable rejection could be raised by anyone regardless of how he is motivated, and it is only that a rejection could be conceived as reasonable if and only if it is consistent with the contractualist aim of finding mutually acceptable principles for the general regulation of behaviour. Whether we have reason to reject a certain principle is determined by the meta-reason given by the contractualist aim of justifiability to others. In fact, people not actually motivated by the contractualist ideal could lodge complaints to principles governing right and wrong, and their claims would be counted equally as the claims from people who are motivated by the contractualist ideal. The stipulation of ��similarly motivated�� only reminds us in determining whether a principle is reasonably rejected or not, we have to imagine ourselves as a person who is moved by the aim of mutual justification and adjudicate the strength of reasons from different standpoints given this aim. The contractualist ideal of mutual justification provides the context which presupposes the range of reasons that are legitimate in rejecting principles, but not presupposes the range of creatures who can legitimately reject principles in deciding right and wrong.

Now we can move to Scanlon��s own account of moral status. Scanlon claims that, ��contractualism as I understand it locates the source of the reason-giving force of judgments of right and wrong in the importance of standing in a certain relation to others. Morality (in the narrow sense of ��what we owe to each other��) will thus include all those with respect to whom one has strong reason to want to stand in this relation and hence to give weight to its requirements.��(177-178) In this sense, the scope of the morality of right and wrong includes all those beings to whom ��we have good reason to want our actions to be justifiable��. (179) It is quite unclear to say morality of right and wrong applies to a being when ��we have good reasons to justify our actions to them��. Here, it is better to consider an alternative formulation. Scanlon seems to think that for the idea of ��justification to a being�� to make sense, the being in question must possess the capacities in raising reasonable rejection in deciding mutually acceptable principles. We cannot justify our actions to beings who themselves lack the ability in reasonably rejecting principles. Therefore, the standard in assigning moral status in the morality of right and wrong could be formulated as whether it makes sense to talk of ��justification to�� the being and whether the being could reasonably reject principles in deciding mutually acceptable principles.

What kinds of beings are included in this understanding of the scope of the morality of right and wrong? Scanlon characterizes a number of possible classes which we may have good reason to want our actions to be justifiable; they may help us in understanding what conditions are required by the idea of ��justifiability�� to a being:

(1) Those beings that have a good; that is, those for which things can go better or worse;

(2) Those beings in group (1) who are conscious and capable of feeling pain; that is, all those sentient creatures;

(3) Those beings in group (2) who are sensitive to reasons and capable of judging things as better or worse; that is, in Scanlon��s words, beings capable of holding judgment-sensitive attitudes;

(4) Those beings in group (3) who possess the capacity of language in moral reasoning; that is, beings capable of making the particular kind of judgments involved in moral reasoning;

Group (1) is too broad a class of beings to whom we have reason to justify our actions. Although ��having a good�� may be a necessary condition for generating moral status, not all things that ��have a good�� can be said to be capable in claiming justification from us for our actions. In the most abstract sense, natural objects like redwoods forests and historical buildings like the Grand Canal can be said to ��have a good�� since it makes sense to talk of conditions being better or worse for these things. Yet, the kind of relationship we stand for natural objects or historical buildings seems to be a different one from the kind of relationship we stand for other human beings. Even if it makes sense to say that destroying natural objects or historical buildings just for fun is in a broader sense ��morally wrong��, it derives its reason-giving force from a different motivational basis for ��what we owe to each other��. To say we have disrespected the moral status of these natural objects or historical buildings does not seem to be a correct description of the wrongness of our action of destroying them�Xthey are not the kind of beings that can be wronged in the strict sense. ��Justification�� to these kinds of object does not make sense if these objects are not conscious and not capable to judge things to be better or worse. Therefore, ��having a good�� is not sufficient (although necessary) to ground the idea of ��justifiability�� to a being.

Moving to Group (4), another extreme for the moment, it seems quite clear that those beings who are capable of moral reasoning and making moral judgments, capable of judging things as better or worse, sentient and having a good are those to whom we have strong reason to want our actions to be justifiable. Scanlon thinks these conditions together can provide a sufficient condition for a being in claiming justification from us, and there is no need to further restrict the range of beings to a more limited class of beings. (180) Are these conditions also necessary for a being in claiming justification? All beings having these criteria are owed justification for our actions; yet, it may be too restricted to hold that only beings in this group to which justification could be owed. Beings who possess the capacity to judge things as better or worse may nonetheless lack the capacity in making moral judgments in moral reasoning. Scanlon thinks that for these beings, who are included in group (3) but excluded from group (4), the idea of ��justification�� still makes sense, and we also have reason to care about it. Their capacities in judging things as better or worse and rational self-direction represent rationality in a minimalist sense and call for the kind of respect that entails treating them only in ways that they could not reasonably reject. (180) The capacity in making moral judgments in moral reasoning is not necessary, provided that the beings could have the capacity in assessing reasons. Contractualism, as Scanlon suggests, would not draw the bounds of the morality of right and wrong more narrowly than group (3).

The scope of the morality of right and wrong therefore lies somewhere between group (2) and group (3). Group (2) contains all sentient beings while group (3) contains only sentient beings which are rational in a minimalist sense. I have argued above that being sentient is a necessary condition for a being to whom we could attribute ��justification. Nevertheless, whether it is also a sufficient condition is suspicious. If we take the idea of ��justification�� seriously, it is not clear whether sentient but not rational beings like animals could comprehend justification. As Will Kymlicka claims, ��agreement requires comprehension. I cannot agree to something that I cannot comprehend, and many beings who feel pain cannot comprehend justifications.�� In order to justify something to a being, the being must possess the capacity in assessing reasons and be able to judge things as better or worse. Scanlon characterizes this capacity as the capacity of having judgment-sensitive attitudes. Judgment-sensitive attitudes are ��attitudes that an ideally rational person would come to have whenever that person judged there to be sufficient reasons for them and that would�K ��extinguish�� when that person judged them not to be supported by reasons of the appropriate kind.��(20) Only when a sentient being also possesses the capacity in having judgment-sensitive that it makes sense and we have reason to attribute justification to it. Having rationality in this minimalist sense is necessary for claiming justification from us. As there is no need to further restrict the scope of the morality of right and wrong to cover beings in group (4), Group (3) represents the range of beings to whom we have reason to justify our actions. Having a good, being sentient, and being rational in the minimalist sense as mentioned above therefore represent the necessary and sufficient conditions for a being in claiming justification for our actions from us.

Scanlon thinks that group (3) seems to extend very little if at all beyond the class of human beings. (180) All human beings with normal capacities are included within the range of beings who can claim justifications for our actions. However, limiting the scope of the morality of right and wrong to beings with the capacity to hold judgment-sensitive attitudes may seem too restrictive if all possible kinds of human beings are taken into consideration. There are kinds of human beings who do not possess and even could not develop the capacity in assessing reasons and having judgment-sensitive attitudes, including infants, young children, severely retarded people and unconscious ��trees��. Drawing the boundary in this way would seem to exclude all of them. Another problem concerning its implication on the moral status of human beings is whether past and future generation are also counted as having moral status. Even these beings normally can possess the capacity in holding judgment-sensitive attitudes, it is not clear whether all of them could actually demand justifications from us. We could justify our actions to contemporaries, but does it make sense to say we could justify to those already dead and those not yet born in which justification could only be made in principle but not through actual agreement? The question of moral status for future generation is further complicated if we take into consideration the non-identity problem�Xwhether future people can be wronged by our action or policy if it is also true that if a different action or policy has been followed, these particular future people would not have existed.

Scanlon proposes the idea of ��trusteeship�� to extend the range of beings who can possess moral status to cover all those human beings mentioned above. Instead of asking what these beings actually could reject in deciding non reasonably-rejected principles, we can imagine trustees representing them and ask what these trustees, who possess normal capacities, would reasonably reject in respect of these incapable beings. For infants, young children and adults who do not develop normal capacities, the idea of justifiability must be understood counterfactually, ��in terms of what they could reasonably reject if they were able to understand such a question.��(185) For past and future generations, the idea of trusteeship also enables us to ask for what they would reasonably reject, despite the fact that any literal agreement is impossible. Trustee of people who has passed away can well represent their interests even though our duties to them are more limited than what we owe to our contemporaries due to the limited ways in which the interests of these dead people can be affected by our actions. The idea of trusteeship is also consistent with the non-identity problem. This problem is a substantive question about when we have wronged someone, not a question about whether those future people could be wronged. The idea of trustee for these possible future people makes sense and it is reasonable to consider their concern to our present actions or policies (especially in consumption of resources and environmental policies). With the idea of trusteeship, we can extend the notion of ��justification�� to apply to human beings who do not possess the ability in assessing reasons and in literally agreeing to anything, including infants, young children, severely disabled people, and past and future generation. This seems to enable contractualism to avoid the charge that it has implausible implication over the moral status of these kinds of human beings who may not be able to claim justification from us actually.

The idea of trusteeship, however, may seem to be ad hoc in fixing the inadequacy of attributing moral status in terms of the idea of ��justification��. Will Kymlicka claims,

��Scanlon tries to get around this by saying that we can address a justification to an infant��s trustee. But this is a clumsy attempt to save the thesis. The reason we give moral consideration to a child has nothing to do with the idea that we address a justification to a trustee.��

Even if it is intuitively appealing to apply the idea of trusteeship to future and past generation because they normally possess the capacity in raising reasonable rejection but are just deprived of the chance to do so, it is doubtful why it is also applicable in the case of infants, young children and severely disabled people given that they do not possess the necessary capacities in assessing reasons and raising reasonable rejection. The idea of trusteeship indeed helps to extend the range of beings having moral status to include nearly all human beings; yet, what is the reason for appealing to trusteeship at the fist place? Could we also apply trusteeship to cover beings in group (2) and group (1) above? In what circumstances should we appeal to the trustee of a being, given that the being itself could not raise reasonable rejection? As David Phillips argues, part of the problem of Scanlon��s account is that it is difficult to know what kind of argument would settle the question of the elasticity of the concept of trusteeship and hence the idea of justification. Scanlon has to specify the reason why trusteeship is applicable in the case of infants, young children and severely disabled human beings, but not necessarily on animals and natural objects.

Scanlon has argued for the reason why the idea of trusteeship is applicable for these human beings in What we owe to each other, although I think his argument may not be as strong as he expects. For infants and young children, whom I will call potentially rational beings below, even though they do not possess the capacities in assessing reasons at the present stage, they possess the potential in developing into the kind of being who can exercise the capacity in assessing reasons in future. ��Infancy and childhood are, in normal cases, stages in the life of a being who will have the capacity for judgment-sensitive attitudes.�� (185) There is no reason to deny justification to them simply because they temporarily lack the capacity in assessing reasons that they will normally develop in future. Trusteeship is therefore applicable in deciding what duties we owe to them.

For other temporarily disabled people such as temporarily unconscious ��tress��, the same rationale applies because they just temporarily lack the capacity in assessing reasons. In normal circumstances, they can exercise their rationality in assessing reasons, and justification to them makes perfect sense with the idea of what they would reasonably reject if they were competent and conscious. These temporarily disabled humans have reason to want those things that any human has reason to want, insofar as these are things that they are capable of benefiting them. This would include protection, care, affection, and respecting their rights over their own body parts. The case may be more difficult for beings who are not only temporarily disabled but permanently disabled, for example those inborn retarded person. For these permanently disabled beings who could never develop even the limited capacities required by judgment-sensitive attitudes, Scanlon thinks we still have reasons to give them justifications even though they may never be able to weigh or understand justifications. Scanlon��s argument appeals to the fact that these severely disabled beings are members of the community of other human beings which in turn grants them equal moral status with others:

��The mere fact that a being is ��of human born�� provides a strong reason for according it the same status as other humans�KThe beings in question here are ones who are born to us or to others to whom we are bound by the requirements of justifiability. This tie of birth gives us good reason to want to treat them ��as human�� despite their limited capacities.�� (185)

Appealing to the biological and social fact that these permanently disabled beings are members of our community seems more like an argument of ��extending sympathy�� rather than an argument basing on the idea of ��extending justification�� to a being. Yet if Scanlon really argues in terms of sympathy, it departs from his original standard in ascribing moral status to a being�Xwhether the being is rational in a minimalist sense. Scanlon��s general idea is not to ascribe moral status to human beings because they possess this kind of rationality; rather, moral status is ascribed to human beings because we are members of a kind of beings who normally possess this kind of rationality, no matter whether we actually do possess these normal capacities. This is evidential in his discussion of the moral status of potentially rational beings, temporarily disabled beings and permanently disabled beings. All of them are attributed moral status not because they actually possess rationality in the minimalist sense; rather, they are attributed moral status because they are a kind of beings who normally possess this kind of rationality. Scanlon has explicitly claimed that the scope of the morality of right and wrong ��will include at least all those beings who are of a kind that is normally capable of judgment-sensitive attitudes.��(My emphasis) (186) The standard in ascribing moral status thus rests on a Kantian assumption that every human being possesses equal moral status. Scanlon��s argument seems to borrow its force from this Kantian notion rather than deriving it. Equal moral status for every human being turns out to be a basic assumption in Scanlon��s argument. Of course we have reason to justify our actions to all human beings; yet the reason in fact depends on the assumption that all human beings have equal moral status. Scanlon��s contractualism cannot provide an independent argument for why every human being does have this equal status.

It is not illegitimate for Scanlon to borrow the Kantian notion of equal moral status for all human beings as long as his aim is not to justify the moral status of all human beings. His aim is just to provide a basis for understanding how the argument for moral status of different beings should go within the framework of contractualism, and to show his theory will not have counter-intuitive implications over issues of moral status. As a Kantian approach to the problem of moral status itself, contractualism does not argue why the Kantian assumption is necessarily true apart from resorting to its great intuitive appeal. David Phillips is quite right to claim that Scanlon ��hasn��t given us a plausible way to decide all issues of moral status�� (my emphasis); but I cannot agree with his conclusion that ��Scanlon does not seem to give a plausible basis for arguing about questions of moral status.�� The basis is whether we have reason to justify our actions to the being in question, and whether we have reason to participate in that kind of relationship with them. This basis helps us to explain why moral status is accord to human beings who do not possess rationality in the minimalist sense but not necessary to animals who do not possess the same capacity. Human beings are of a kind of beings who normally possess this capacity while animals are not a kind of being who could possess this kind of rationality in whatever circumstances. The attempt of assigning trusteeship to potentially rational, temporarily disabled or permanently disabled human beings is not ad hoc if we take into consideration the Kantian idea that every human being possesses equal moral status. We cannot arbitrarily assign trustee to other beings without good reasons.

Scanlon��s contractualism surely possess an advantage in explaining the moral status of human beings as compared with those rational choice or self-interest based contract theories because he does not limit the scope of his theory to beings who are capable and willing to enter an agreement of mutual advantages. Consider David Gauthier��s contractarianism, a paradigm of rational choice contract theory, as a contrast: in Morals by Agreement, (1985), Gauthier sets out to ��develop a theory of morals as part of the theory of rational choice�� He wants to argue that rational individuals, whose aim is to maximize their subjective preferences, when facing social situations typified by the Prisoner��s Dilemma, these rational individuals will try to constrain their dispositions and become ��constraint maximizers��. Given empirical situations, each individual will rationally agree to accept certain constraints on individual actions and they will also rationally comply with such agreements. Understanding morality in this way, an individual A has moral standing in relation to another individual B if and only if A and B are in the ��circumstances of justice��, that is, if and only if they can cooperate to benefit both and both would forgo maximizing in order to achieve cooperative gains. Many commentators have argued that this characterization of the scope of morality would have counter-intuitive implications on the moral status of human beings. As David Phillips claims, it implies those who are unable or unwilling to constrain their behaviour toward me, those unable to benefit me, and those I would be better off exploiting would lack moral status with respect to me because we are not situated within the ��circumstances of justice��. It is doubtful why moral status is accorded to infants, young children and those severely sick, given the fact that they are not capable to offer mutual advantages to those normal adults. For those people who are in a very weak social position, for example those from a minority race or those from a low-income group, even though they are sentient and rational, it is not sure why those people with a strong social position who are quite sure that they can continue their domination and exploitation over these weaker groups would agree to set constraints on their behaviour. For future generation, as admitted by Gauthier himself, ��although an individual can do much to benefit or harm his descendants, only those whose lives overlap with his can benefit or harm him in return.�� It is uncertain why we have to consider the concern of generations in distant future if the agreement between us and them is characterized by mutually beneficiary cooperation. Gauthier has argued why he does not think his contractarianism would have counter-intuitive implications over these issues in Morals by Agreement; however, due to the intrinsic nature of self-interest based contract theories, I think his attempt could achieve little success. As the assignment of moral status depends on a relational, but not intrinsic property of a being, and this relation is characterized by the ability in offering mutual advantages, moral status is difficult to be claimed as universal.

Scanlon��s contractualism also characterizes the basis for assigning moral status to a being in terms of whether it stands in a certain relation with others. However, it is not a relation of mutual advantage but a relation of mutual justification. The assignment of moral status does not depend on whether a being possesses the capacities in offering mutual advantage to other individuals; instead, it depends on whether the being possess the capacities in giving and assessing reasons. Justification to a being does not depend on the contingent fact that the being is able to benefit us. As long as the being is of a kind of being that normally possess rationality in the minimalist sense, no matter whether it is willing to and able to participate in mutually advantageous social cooperation, the being��s considerations are given a weight in moral deliberation. Understanding moral status of human beings in terms of their rationality may also have questionable implications; yet, as I have argued above, it is much easier to argue why we have reason to justify our actions to all human beings than to argue why we have reason to engage in mutually advantageous cooperation with others. As a theory of reciprocal justification rather than a theory of reciprocal advantage, Scanlon��s contractualism enjoys the theoretical advantage in explaining the moral status of all human beings.

I will conclude this section with a related discussion about the moral status of animals and environmental ethics. Animals and natural objects are typical examples of beings in group (2) and group (1) in the above classification scheme respectively. Consider the moral status of animals first. Does justification to sentient but non-rational animals makes sense? It seems if the idea of trusteeship is applicable to human beings who actually (either temporarily or permanently) do not possess the required capacity in having judgment-sensitive attitudes, then the same idea is also available for sentient animals capable of having a good. Scanlon wants to leave open the answer for whether animals do possess moral status in the sense of ��what we owe to each other�� when he claims that the scope of the morality of right and wrong ��may include nonrational creatures as well, depending on how the idea of trusteeship is taken to apply.�� (186) However, he is more inclined to the view that although it is ��morally�� objectionable in the broad sense to fail to take into consideration the pain and distress of non-rational animals, we cannot wrong them in exactly the same sense in which we can wrong humans. (184) There is an alternative view that animals do count in the scope of the morality of right and wrong. The two views can agree on the fact that we have strong reason not to harm animals arbitrarily, but they will differ on the nature of the reasons behind�Xthe latter view claims that it is morally objectionable to harm animals arbitrarily because we owe a justification to them just like we owe a justification to human beings; while the former (Scanlon��s) view claims that it is morally objectionable to do so not because we owe a justification to them but because of other reasons, for example because causing pain to a sentient being without good reason is itself objectionable.

Proponents for including sentient animals in the scope of the morality of right and wrong may claim that as long as trustees are available for sentient human beings who lack rationality in the minimalist sense, there is no reason to deny trusteeship to sentient animals who lack the same kind of capacity. I have argued above why this argument is not necessarily correct. Those disabled human beings are included in the scope of ��what we owe to each other�� because they are members of a kind of being who normally possess the required capacity, and we have good reasons to extend the scope of justification to them by the idea of trusteeship because of sympathy or respect for their humanity. This reason is not applicable in the case of animals. Someone may claim that we do sometimes ��personalized�� animals and treat them just as the same as human beings. Some of us may value taking ourselves to have a relationship with our pets that is modelled on that between humans, a relationship characterized by mutual expectation, reciprocated affection and emotions like disappointment and anger. (182) This may support the claim that we do have reason to extend our scope of justification to include non-rational animals because our relationship with them is just the same as our relationship with other human beings.

Not all people accept this attitude towards animals and this conception of the relationship between human beings and animals, however. Even if we accept our relationship with pets are personalized in a certain extent and justification towards them makes sense in a certain way, it is not clear whether it is exactly the same kind of relation we stand with other human beings and whether it is the same kind of justification as we owe to human beings. Personally, I agree with Scanlon��s inclined stipulation of the scope of the morality of right and wrong to cover only human beings for two reasons. First, it can avoid difficulty in accounting the motivational basis of ��what we owe to each other�� and we can specify clearly the motivation is based on an identical kind of relationship between human beings only. Second, accepting the claim that non-rational animals are included within the scope of the morality of right and wrong would entail that human beings and animals would possess equal moral status because their claims would be counted equally in deciding our duties to them. Although some advocators of animal rights do think animals should be treated equally with human beings in all aspects of our life, it is better for Scanlon to avoid committing to this controversial claim. As long as ��animal rights�� and ��what we owe to each other�� represent different domains within ��morality��, Scanlon can well admit that animals possess moral status but their moral status is of a different kind (and hence of different importance) with that of human beings. The remaining question is how we should weigh the relative importance of the moral status between human beings and animals. How should we decide when there is a conflict between our moral duties to others and animal rights? This is not a question within the morality of right and wrong but a question concerning the relationship between this domain and other possible domains. I should leave this question for further research.

Concerning problems over environmental ethics, apart from the general implications over the claims of future generations and animals as discussed above, Scanlon��s contractualism also has implications over the moral status for natural objects. As in the arguments for animal rights, Scanlon allows that although it may be ��morally�� wrong in the broad sense to destroy natural objects like redwood forest without good reasons, it is not wrong in the sense of ��what we owe to each other�� in doing so. Natural objects are not beings that we can attribute justification to in a strict sense. I have no disagreements over this limitation of the scope of the morality of right and wrong. Yet, even though the kind of relationship we stand with natural environment is different from the one that we stand with other human beings, it provides an insight in conceiving our relation with the natural environment. As shown in Scanlon��s classification scheme, most westerners would regard natural objects as beings of group (1): having a good in an abstract sense but would never consider them as possible candidates in group (2): being capable to feel pain or being sentient in the minimalist sense. However, it is not surprising to find this conception of natural objects in traditional Chinese philosophy. Especially in Daoism, special attention is paid to the relation between human beings and the natural environment, and natural objects are sometimes conceived as sentient beings possessing emotions and feelings as human beings. Most of the time this conception of the ��nature�� is presented in metaphors but it is sufficient to show that this conception is deep-rooted in Chinese thought. There is a famous Chinese idiom, ��every single flower and every single tree is affectionate��. Of course I do not mean natural objects are sentient in the same sense as human beings are; my point is just that if it makes sense to say we can ��personalized�� our relation with pets, it also makes sense to ��personalized�� our relation with the natural environment; and the idea of trusteeship is also available for natural objects if they are conceived as sentient. We may have reason to treat natural objects and the environment as ��friends��, not only as something to be overcome or defeated. This would undermine the claim that these natural objects just possess instrumental value to human beings. I do not want to argue that our relation with natural environment is just the same as our relation with other human beings, nor to argue that natural objects possess the same moral status as that of human beings. I just want to point out that we can proceed to questions concerning relation between human beings and natural objects with the methodology endorsed in Scanlon��s contractualism�Xby characterizing a valuable form of relation between human beings and natural environment and use it as a base for developing an unified account of environment ethics. With a more liberal conception of ��trusteeship�� and ��justification��, together with a new understanding of the relation between human beings and environment, we can develop a different approach to environment problems. I have only presented a very rough idea here; I hope I can contribute more in this area in future.

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