2004-03-20 - 5:31 p.m.

Chapter 5

The Scope of Morality

Throughout Chapter 2, 3, and 4, I have discussed Scanlon��s contractualism in terms of its normative and motivational basis, and also its divergence with consequentialism as a normative theory and a foundational theory. In this concluding chapter, I will shift my focus onto some general issues in moral philosophy which is related to my previous discussion of Scanlon��s contractualism. The first issue I will address concerns the general conception of ��morality�� in the broader sense. If ��morality�� in the broader sense is not constituted only by ��what we owe to each other��, what exactly does it consist of? Is it a single and unified concept which can be explained in terms of a single moral theory? Scanlon thinks although ��what we owe to each other��, as a central and important domain of ��morality��, is an unified conception and concerns a single subject matter, ��morality�� in the broader sense does not demonstrate this kind of unity. In section 5.1, I will attend to this question as ��fragmentation of the moral and unity of ��what we owe to each other����. Section 5.2 will deal with a related question of our moral status under ��what we owe to each other��. What is the scope of ��morality�� in this sense? I will discuss some of the merits and criticisms of Scanlon��s description of the range of features whom could be wronged in the sense of violating our duties owed to them. This will help us to acquire a better basis in understanding recent debates over moral status of human beings, animals and also natural objects in applied ethics.

5. 1 Fragmentation of the Moral and Unity of ��what we owe to each other��

In the ��Introduction�� of What we owe to each other, Scanlon sets out three main tasks in writing the book, namely: (i) to give a fuller characterization of the subject matter of the particular part of morality concerning our moral duties to each other individuals; (ii) to explain the kind of moral reasoning which enables us to arrive at judgments about right and wrong in this particular part of morality; and (iii) to clarify the motivational basis and normativity of these judgments. (1-2) Scanlon defines a moral theory as ��a systematic attempt to describe the process through which we should go about answering such first-order moral questions and to explain why we should regard this process and its results as having special importance.�� I have discussed Scanlon��s arguments for his contractualist moral reasoning and contractualist moral motivation of ��what we owe to each other�� in previous chapters. Here, I will go on to discuss whether ��what we owe to each other�� does constitute a single and unified subject matter within ��morality�� and examine its implications on our understanding of ��morality�� in the broad sense.

Scanlon��s contractualism consists of two components: (i) the normative component and (ii) the motivational component. The normative component characterizes the general content of ��what we owe to each other��, and an act is wrong in this sense ��if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.�� (153) The motivational component characterizes the motivational basis for the normative component, holding that the ideal of mutual justification and recognition provides us with reason to be moved by ��the aim of finding and being able to justify one��s conduct by appeal to principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one can reasonably reject��. These two components are unified by the idea of justifiability to others. The ideal of mutual justification and recognition gives us reason in recognizing the importance of ��what we owe to each other�� and at the same time shape the context in deciding which principles could be reasonably rejected or accepted. In this sense, Scanlon��s contractualist theory of ��what we owe to each other�� represents a unified account in a particular domain in ��morality���Xa domain named as ��the morality of right and wrong�� by Scanlon, which comprises a distinct subject matter, and unified by a single manner of reasoning and by a common motivational basis.

Scanlon admits that his account does not represent the whole sphere of ��morality�� broadly conceived. ��Morality�� in common usage is usually applied to a wider range of cases apart from our moral duties to others. Scanlon raises certain examples to illustrate these cases. First, there are certain values that ��what we owe to each other�� does not account for, and yet most people would not deny cases involving them as ��moral�� issues. Scanlon��s own examples include (i) certain ��deviant�� forms of sexual conduct which do not affect our relations to others directly, (ii) failure in developing one��s own talent or meeting high standards in one��s profession, and also (iii) wanton destruction of works of nature ��just for fun��. They are ��morally�� wrong not in the sense of violating our moral duties to other individuals. Second, some kinds of behavior usually discussed within the context of morality, even if they can be accounted by ��what we owe to each other��, do not derive their motivational basis from the contractualist ideal. For example, obligations to one��s own children might be explained by the fact that they are particularly dependent on our support and protection and therefore children should be looked after by parents just because of being a person. However, to be a good parent, one should not only be moved by a general sense of obligation but should be moved by his or her special concern to the children. For love from parents to their own children, and in fact other kinds of special concern among individuals including friendship, contractualism seems not to be the correct account of the motivational basis for these behaviors. ��Morality�� in the broader sense involves these kinds of behavior that do not derive their motivational basis from the contractualist motivation of justifiability to others. (171-172)

These examples make Scanlon to conclude that ��the contractualist view I am presenting does not account either for the content or the motivational basis of all that the term ��morality��, as it is used by many if not most people, is commonly taken to cover.��(172) ��Morality�� is commonly used as if it is a single normative domain, having the same subject matter and an unified account of reasoning and motivational basis. ��Moral considerations�� is to be contrasted with other considerations such as ��prudential considerations�� and ��rational considerations�� in personal deliberation or with ��economic considerations�� and ��political considerations�� in social policy making. Sometimes, people even used ��morality�� in an all-things-considered sense, holding that ��moral�� judgments by definition are overriding over all other considerations. ��Morality�� in this sense covers an even broader boundary, including virtually all considerations that could be relevant in the evaluation of an evaluative focal point. Scanlon��s interest is not focused on this broad concept of ��morality��. It is not clear how its boundaries could be drawn exactly and it is doubtful whether any attempt in identifying a single account of its normative content and motivational basis would be successful. Scanlon treats ��morality�� in the broader sense as covering a diverse sets of values and domains which are difficult to explain in terms of a single moral theory�Xhe calls it ��fragmentation of the moral��. His aim is not to account for this vague and ambiguous concept of ��morality�� but just to concentrate on a relatively narrower domain (��the morality of right and wrong��) which shows a kind of unity in terms of its normative content and motivational basis.

This general picture of ��morality�� in the broader sense has been suggested by Thomas Nagel in his ��The fragmentation of value��. There, Nagel identifies five main types of domains that display a fragmentation of ��morality�� broadly conceived, including (i) specific obligations to other people or institutions, (ii) constraints derived from general rights, (iii) general welfare and utility, (iv) perfectionist ends such as values of achievements and creations, and (v) personal commitment to one��s own project and undertakings. He believes all these fragmented domains have fundamentally different kinds of basis and their sources are not unitary. They do not represent the pursuit of some single good in a variety of settings. Moreover, these different domains may conflict in practical decision-making because they would give rise to different directives to actions. Scanlon does not share his categories of domains, yet the general picture articulated by him resembles Nagel��s general view about ��morality��. He particularly focuses on our obligations to others and tries to develop a comprehensive and unified account of its normative content and motivational basis. Scanlon attempts to accommodate the importance of other domains within this domain of moral duties to others, but he does not aim at reunifying them into a single account. Other domains are related to ��what we owe to each other�� because they are taken into account in deciding non-reasonably rejected principles; however, they are not ��reducible�� to it. (173)They are still independent domains having their own particular normative content and motivational basis.

With Scanlon��s general thesis of ��fragmentation of the moral and unity of ��what we owe to each other����, the charge that his account is incomplete can be dissolved. Yet, there may still be some other objections to this general thesis. Let��s consider some possible challenges here. First, concerning the unity of ��what we owe to each other��, although contractualism demonstrates a unified structure in terms of its normative content and normative basis, it does not seem to be an independent domain from other possible domains within ��morality��. In determining our moral duties to others at the first place, values from other domains play the important role as something that give individuals reasons in rejecting principles for the general regulation of behavior. These values shape the content of ��what we owe to each other��. In other words, the aim of justifiability to others only moves us to work out a formal system of justification that meets its demands, but whether we have a certain duty towards others in fact depends on how strong the reasons individuals have in rejecting principles, and these reasons are derived from their proper response towards different values. This is a continuing process of revising and refining our conception of the reasons we have in different situations, and there is no fixed list of non-reasonably rejected principles that constitute the content for and shape the boundary of ��what we owe to each other��. The boundary of ��what we owe to each other�� seems to be vague and its content is unstable, depending on its interaction with other values.

A further worry arising from the dependence of ��what we owe to each other�� on other values is suggested by R. J. Wallace. The importance of the diverse values in deciding ��what we owe to each other�� represents a tendency towards pluralism in the domain of right and wrong, contrary to Scanlon��s wish in constructing it as a single account with the same subject matter. If loyalty, suffering, betrayal, need, autonomy and rights all play central role in deciding ��what we owe to each other��, why not simply say we are responding to these values directly when we are having normative reflection in right and wrong? It is not a challenge towards the ideal of mutual justification and recognition as the motivational basis of ��what we owe to each other���XScanlon certainly could agree that these diverse values could be unified by the idea of ��justifiability to others��. The challenge raised by Wallace is a different one. He just doubts whether Scanlon��s unified account is phenomenologically more plausible than the pluralist position. Why do we suppose there is a unified account threading along these diverse values but not just regard them as separate and even more fragmented domains? Once Scanlon argues that ��morality�� in the broader sense is composed of diverse domains or values and therefore ��fragmented��, the similar question whether the morality of right and wrong should best be understood as diverse moral values and thus lack the unity Scanlon claims for it will naturally arise under similar kind of reflection.

To counter-argue, Scanlon can well admit his account of ��what we owe to each other�� is not an independent account, yet still insists that it is a unified domain in an important sense. So far, the uncertainty in content does not mean ��what we owe to each other�� is not a distinctive moral domain with a single subject matter, reasoning manner and motivational basis. Although the boundary of ��what we owe to each other�� is not clearly stated out, it is not a concept as vague as ��morality�� broadly conceived. We do not have a fixed list of principles, but the formal requirement in rejecting and accepting principles does help us to locate the contour of the whole domain. The uncertainty in content arises out of complexities and indeterminacies in actual situations but not because of a lack of unified structure of ��what we owe to each other��. We can still identify its subject matter within a single and unified structure. Moreover, Scanlon��s aim is to construct a framework that can account for the plurality of values within a unified structure and it is doubtful why a constructivist account like this one must avoid employing other moral concepts in constructing its own content. These other moral concepts or values shape the content of ��what we owe to each other�� but do not dismiss it. They still requires the unifying framework of ��what we owe to each other�� to work out answers in the morality of right and wrong. The dependence of ��what we owe to each other�� on other values therefore does not render it fragmented and threaten the unity of its structure.

Wallace��s particular worry can be eased if we note the fact that other values do not directly determine the content of ��what we owe to each other�� but just serve as considerations to be involved in the framework of justification that give individuals agent-relative reasons in rejecting principles. ��What we owe to each other�� is a unified account comparing different individual reasons on the basis of the meta-reason of justifiability to others. The importance of different values is arranged following the ideal of mutual justification and recognition. In fact, Scanlon��s contractualism does not show a tendency towards pluralism of values at the basic level of deliberation. There is only one basic value for ��what we owe to each other���Xthe ideal of mutual justification and recognition. The importance of all other values is derived from this basic value in determining our moral duties to others. Diverse values are then ��unified�� within a single framework of argument in the domain of morality of right and wrong. More importantly, as I have argued in Chapter 4 Section 4.2, as a constructivist account for a particular domain in morality, it is not necessary for Scanlon to deny the possibility of a pluralism of values. What he needs to do is to construct a unified framework in which diverse values can interact to determine specific answers in this domain. The phenomenology of value pluralism does not threaten the internal consistency of the whole framework.

Another challenge to the general thesis of ��unity of ��what we owe to each other�� and fragmentation of the moral�� concerns ��fragmentation of the moral��. By arguing that morality of right and wrong composes the ��central part�� of morality and dominates the discussions in contemporary moral philosophy, (171, 173) Scanlon seems to have under-estimated the importance of other possible normative domains. In illustrating how there can be areas within the broader sense of ��morality�� that morality of right and wrong cannot account for or provide their motivational basis, the examples discussed by Scanlon are just some fragmented and loosely-structured values (the values of natural works, values of professional excellence, and values of some forms of sexual behavior). If these values are examined separately, they are fragmented and could not show any tight structure in competing with ��what we owe to each other�� for the ��central part�� of ��morality��. However, Scanlon has ignored the possibility of other normative domains that may also show a unified structure in reasoning and motivational basis and at the same time covers a large area within ��morality��. One such possible domain is the domain of general welfare. In fact, many people believe the central concern of ��morality�� is not duties to other individuals but the general welfare of every human being. In this domain, human well-being is the central subject matter and the most popular substantive account in identifying its normative content is utilitarianism, which usually appeal to the ideal of ��greatest general happiness�� as its motivational basis. General welfare or human well-being include all aspects of harm and benefit to all sentient beings. The benefits of political systems, socio-economic systems, medical research and education are obvious concerns of human well-being.

There may be different substantive accounts in explaining the content of ��general welfare�� or ��human well-being��; yet no matter what the components of them are, the main concern of this domain is the promotion of well-being generally for everyone but not our moral duties to each other individuals. The subject matter of this domain is utterly different from that of the morality of right and wrong but it can also show a unified structure in moral reasoning and motivational basis. Although the two domains have different subject matter, they are not independent from each other because there must be some areas where the two domains would show overlapping concern. For example, the ethics of medical research involves both concerns over general welfare and obligations between patients and researchers. Nevertheless, ��morality of right and wrong�� and ��general welfare�� are still different domains demonstrating different subject matter and employing different methods in moral reasoning and moral motivation.

Other possible domains different from the domain of moral duties to others include the domain of ��general human rights��, the domain of ��social justice��, the domain of ��moral duties to groups and organizations�� and even more. The point here is not to argue which domain is the ��central part of morality�� or which of them is being referred to when people are talking of ��morality�� in everyday conversation. Rather, what I want to show is the possibility of some other unified domains which demonstrate much tighter structures than that of those values illustrated by Scanlon in explaining fragmentation of the moral. These diverse domains represent different ��kingdoms�� within the broader sphere of ��morality��, even though they are not independent because they have overlapping boundaries.

This understanding of the general picture of ��morality�� does not threaten the unity of the domain denoted by ��what we owe to each other��; yet, the fragmentation of these moral domains may create problems in practical decision making. Nagel notes a disparity between the fragmentation of these domains and the singleness of decision. Different domains may require different courses of action in the very same situation given their different ultimate concerns and motivational basis. This is particularly apparent when we consider the requirements of the domain of ��general welfare�� and requirements from other domains such as ��rights�� and ��moral duties to others��. Given different directives for actions from different domains and their different source of moral motivation, it is difficult to identify a single scale on which the importance of these diverse domains can be measured or balanced when conflict arises. If we do not have any method of rationalizing decision in case of conflict, would this fragmentation of moral domains create internal inconsistency within ��morality��? More importantly, if in practical decision making, our concern is not limited to the domain of our more duties to others, what is the use of presenting a unified account in this particular domain?

To be fair to Scanlon, he is not in the position to answer how we should decide among the domains of ��morality�� in the broader sense in cases of conflict. His concern is limited to the narrower domain of our moral duties to others and his aim is only to demonstrate how we should decide under ��what we owe to each other�� and why that is usually an important issue. Scanlon has argued in most cases where relations between individuals are at stake, ��what we owe to each other�� deserves a priority over other values because (i) it has taken other values into consideration in deciding our moral duties to others; and (ii) the ideal of mutual justification and recognition usually serves as a master-value in cases involving inter-personal relations. Once he had argued for the importance and priority of this domain over other values in usual cases, there is no further need for him to show it is overriding in every possible situation. In fact, when he admits that in some cases what we have most reasons to do may not be the option required by ��what we owe to each other��, he is aware of the fact that the morality of right and wrong is not always the decisive factor in practical decision and it could not outweigh other domains in whatever circumstances. He does not want to specify in what circumstances ��what we owe to each other�� could be outweighed by other domains. Perhaps as Nagel suggests, no single and general principle exists to assess the importance of different domains in all situations. Even if one did, we probably could never discover or articulate such a principle. Different domains may have different importance in different aspects of life. ��General welfare�� may be more decisive when we are making decisions about public policy and ��rights�� may have a more important role in judicial procedure. Their importance varies from case to case and it may be absurd to insist on a rigid and absolute ordering of the importance of different domains in all cases. In everyday decision-making, we may resort to our judgments to decide which value is at stake and respond to the domain with this value as the central concern. It is beyond our capacity to enunciate a general principle to explain our judgments in every particular case. The dependence on judgments does not mean we should decide arbitrarily. Rather, we should consider suggestions from different domains carefully and judge their importance in every particular case. The reasons provided by different domains can serve as important sources for us to make our decisions.

This difficulty in making decision because of fragmentation of ��morality�� therefore does not render moral theories which aim at identifying general principles in different domains trivial. I agree with Nagel��s claim that ��the search for general principles in ethics, or other aspects of practical reasoning, is more likely to be successful if systematic theories restrict themselves to one aspect of the subject�Xone component of rational motivation�Xthen if they try to be comprehensive.�� Moral theories limiting themselves to specific domains may be incomplete in this sense but they would be immune to the indeterminacies and disagreements between different domains in normative deliberation in an all-things-considered sense. In identifying a single manner of reasoning in particular normative domains, they are more suitable for practical justification and interpersonal criticisms in actual circumstances. In fact, clearer characterization of different domains within ��morality�� is necessary for making wise and prudent judgments in particular situations. Scanlon��s main contribution to the field of moral philosophy is characterized by his carving out of a specific domain of our moral duties to others with a unified framework of moral reasoning and moral motivation, which clearly delineates morality of right and wrong from other domains within ��morality��. I think this contribution is significant. As a successor of Nagel, Scanlon has continued his project in moral philosophy�Xto develop a substantive theory for a particular normative domain rather than for ��morality�� as a whole. Although there may still be disagreements over this substantive theory, Scanlon has successfully ignited our concern over this particular domain of right and wrong, just like what John Rawls had done in igniting our concern over justice when he wrote A Theory of Justice. As Nagel remarks in his review of What we owe to each other, Scanlon��s innovative and pioneering discussion of this domain ��will deepen the understanding even of those who are not persuaded by it.�� In the debate for a consequentialist accommodation of contractualism, for example, Philip Pettit has also acknowledged the importance of this domain (which he names as ��civility��) even though he disagrees with Scanlon over the foundation of it.

R. J. Wallace also regards Scanlon��s contractualism as ��a remarkable achievement�� in contemporary moral philosophy because it represents ��the most promising unified account of morality of right and wrong on the contemporary scene��. Not only is it a promising unified account, it is also a competitive account against other alternative theories. Scanlon��s account is appealing, especially when compared with utilitarianism because (i) it does justice to the diversity of considerations in deciding right and wrong and (ii) it pays special attention to individuals in designing principles for the general regulation of behavior. Given the fact that Scanlon has argued enough for why we should pay special attention to this domain, the failure to establish an all-things-considered perspective within ��morality�� seems less a problem. Morality of right and wrong does not represent an all-things-considered perspective; yet it is still a perspective that deserves our highest respect.

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